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THE PURE-HEARTED ABRAMS CASE
Andres Yoder*
One hundred years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes changed his mind about
the right to free speech and wound up splitting the history of free speech law into two.
In his dissent in Abrams v. United States, he called for the end of the old order—in
which courts often ignored or rejected free speech claims—and set the stage for the
current order—in which the right to free speech is of central constitutional impor-
tance. However, a century on, scholars have been unable to identify a specific reason
for Holmes’s Abrams transformation, and have instead pointed to more diffuse
influences. By drawing on heretofore overlooked material, and by investigating the
evolution of Holmes’s political thought, this Article identifies a specific reason for
Holmes’s reversal that is both compelling and new.
Along the way, this Article makes the surprising revelation that Holmes never
believed his influential marketplace-of-ideas concept—that is, his argument in Abrams
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market.” Instead, he only cared about what the intellectual elite thought.
This Article also makes the surprising revelation that big-name journalist and wit H.
L. Mencken pushed Holmes to adopt libertarian free speech rhetoric in the final
stretch of his career. As a result, Mencken emerges as a new contributor to the rise
of modern free speech law.
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Taft . . . [invited us] to the White House to see moving pictures of
a wolf hunt . . . I own as I grow older I dislike the cruelties of sport
and in this case my sympathies were all with the wolf—when I saw
a crowd of men, horses and dogs all after this poor little creature in
his native home.
—Oliver Wendell Holmes in a letter to Ethel Scott1
* Counsel for a federal agency that administers labor laws. G. Edward White, Allen
Mendenhall, and Matthew Marro provided helpful comments.
1 SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
290 (1989) (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Ethel Scott (Dec. 11, 1908)).
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INTRODUCTION
In early 1919, in what can only be described as a stunning letter, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes—the fabled “great oracle” of American law2—apologized to his-
torian and politician Albert Beveridge, “I haven’t thought much on the subject [of
judicial power] . . . .”3 Although Holmes had never doubted the Supreme Court’s
authority to review the constitutionality of acts of Congress,4 he had always rejected
the doctrine of judicial supremacy.5 That is, he did not believe the Court had the
authority to “set its opinions about the correct meaning of the Constitution above
those of Congress.”6 Instead, Holmes believed that when Congress passed a law, it
had every right to embody its own constitutional vision in that law.7 The only question
for the Court was whether it would carry it out. “I don[’]t think the court annuls an
act [as unconstitutional],” Holmes explained to Beveridge.8 “It declines to enforce
it—which for most purposes does annul it indirectly, but not I think in theory.”9
Although Holmes did not believe he had thought extensively about judicial power
at the time he wrote to Beveridge,10 he had by then compiled a decades-long record
of thinking about legislative power.11 And his approach to legislative power was
2 Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 787 (1989).
3 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Albert Beveridge (Jan. 19, 1919) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item
/42976633/44 [https://perma.cc/NB8Q-6U2L].
4 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127–28 (Mass. 1891) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (reviewing the constitutionality of a law); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes
to Franklin Ford (Jan. 13, 1911), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES:SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS,
SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
180, 180 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES] (acknowledging
“the American plan of giving the judges the last word”).
5 See Andres Yoder, The Americanism of Justice Holmes, 39 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353,
380–86 (2017).
6 KEITH E.WHITTINGTON, POLITICALFOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIALSUPREMACY:THE PRESI-
DENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 7 (2007).
7 See Yoder, supra note 5.
8 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Albert Beveridge (Jan. 19, 1919), supra note 3.
9 Id.
10 In the 1873 edition of James Kent’s COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, Holmes, in
an editorial comment, endorsed the view that “the judicial power seems to be limited as
against a co-ordinate branch of the government.” 2 MARKDEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICEOLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS, 1870–1882, at 33–34 (1963) (quoting JAMES
KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *296 n.1 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th
ed. 1873)). To my knowledge, there is no record of Holmes explicitly developing that line
of inquiry further.
11 See, e.g., David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44
DUKE L.J. 449, 462 n.34 (1994) (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to James Bradley
Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893)) (expressing agreement with law professor James Bradley Thayer’s
take on legislative power and his corollary understanding of judicial review).
2020] THE PURE-HEARTED ABRAMS CASE 457
unmistakably shaped by James Bradley Thayer,12 a law professor he knew both pro-
fessionally and socially.13
In his “classic”14 1893 article The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, Thayer asserted that when Congress passes a law, it has the
“primary authority” to “put[] an interpretation on the [C]onstitution.”15 That being so,
he reasoned, the Court should not demand that Congress follow “one specific opinion”
as to the meaning of broad constitutional language.16 The Constitution, after all,
“often admits of different interpretations.”17 Instead, Thayer offered a proposition. The
judiciary’s role, he argued, “is a secondary one.”18 It “is merely that of fixing the out-
side border of reasonable legislative action, the boundary beyond which . . . legislative
power . . . cannot [constitutionally] go.”19 And in order to ensure that the judiciary
stuck to its role, Thayer offered a second proposition: a reasonableness test. “[The
Court] can only disregard [an] Act,” Thayer maintained, “when those who have the
right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear
one,—so clear that it is not open to rational question.”20
As it happened, Holmes’s Thayerian take on judicial review was on full display
only months before he confided in Beveridge. In the 1918 case Hammer v. Dagenhart,
the Court considered the constitutionality of the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of
1916,21 a federal law that banned the cross-border shipment of goods made by chil-
dren.22 Although Justice William Day, writing for the majority, conceded that the
12 See Sanford Byron Gabin, Judicial Review, James Bradley Thayer, and the “Reasonable
Doubt” Test, 3 HASTINGS CONST.L.Q. 961, 961, 986, 988 (1976) (maintaining that Thayer’s
views as to “the proper scope of judicial review” influenced Holmes); see also Yoder, supra note
5, at 380–92 (discussing how Thayer influenced Holmes’s approach to constitutional questions).
13 See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER
SELF 95, 197 (1993).
14 Wallace Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of Holmes,
Brandeis, and Frankfurter, 31 VAND. L. REV. 71, 71 (1978).
15 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 136 (1893). For a discussion of Thayer’s article and his rejection
of judicial supremacy, see Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial
Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 621, 628–29 (2012).
16 Thayer, supra note 15, at 144.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 148.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 144.
21 247 U.S. 251, 268 (1918). To view the text of the Child Labor Act, see Keating-Owen
Child Labor Act of 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675, invalidated by id.
22 Specifically, the Child Labor Act prohibited the “shipment in interstate or foreign com-
merce” of “mine or quarry” products made by children under sixteen; and “mill, cannery,
workshop, factory, or manufacturing” products made by children under fourteen or by children
between fourteen and sixteen who worked “more than eight hours in any day, or more than
six days in any week, or after [7:00 PM], or before [6:00 AM].” Child Labor Act at 675.
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aim of the law was admirable,23 he nevertheless concluded that Congress lacked the
power to enact it.24 The Child Labor Act, he wrote, both exceeded Congress’s power
to regulate commerce, and indirectly invaded the states’ exclusive authority over
“local trade and manufacture.”25
Holmes, however, dissented.26 He began his opinion by identifying Congress’s
general power, in accordance with Thayer’s first proposition.27 “Under the [Commerce
Clause],” he maintained, “Congress . . . may carry out its views of public policy what-
ever indirect effect they may have upon the activities of the States.”28 He then applied
Thayer’s second proposition by subjecting the law to a variation of Thayer’s reason-
ableness test.29 The reasonableness of a law could be established, Thayer taught,
“where the court . . . finds [a challenged law] to be constitutional in its own opinion.”30
And in Holmes’s opinion, the Child Labor Act “was preeminently a case for uphold-
ing” Congress’s power.31 “[I]f there is any matter upon which civilized countries
have agreed,” he reasoned, “it is the evil of premature and excessive child labor.”32
Having thus satisfied himself that Congress “kept within a reasonable interpretation
of its power,”33 he concluded that the law was constitutional.34
So in Hammer, Holmes was unafraid to place his comments on Congress’s author-
ity front and center. Yet even so, he declined to mark the point at which the Supreme
Court would push back. He never attempted, in other words, to identify where exactly
he thought Congress’s Commerce Clause power came to an end. Holmes had always
believed that the extent of a legislative power must be determined by “prick[ing] out
[lines] by the gradual approach and contact of decisions on the opposing sides.”35
Such powers, he reasoned, implicated “conflicting interests[, the] balance [of which]
23 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275 (“That there should be limitations upon the right to employ
children in mines and factories in the interest of their own and the public welfare, all will
admit.”).
24 Id. at 277.
25 Id. at 269–76.
26 See id. at 277–81 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
27 See id. at 281.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 280.
30 Thayer, supra note 15, at 151.
31 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 280.
32 Id.
33 James B. Thayer, Constitutionality of Legislation: The Precise Question for a Court,
NATION, Apr. 10, 1884, at 314.
34 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 281.
35 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112 (1911); see, e.g., Frost & Frost Trucking
Co. v. R.R. Comm. of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 601 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The power
of the State is limited in its turn by the constitutional guaranties of private rights, and it often
is a delicate matter to decide which interest preponderates . . . . The line cannot be drawn by
generalities, but successive points in it must be fixed by weighing the particular facts.”).
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cannot be determined by any general formula in advance.”36 So by the time Holmes
wrote to Beveridge, he undoubtedly realized that Hammer was far from an isolated
case. It was, in fact, emblematic of his entire approach to constitutional questions.
As law professor Yosal Rogat observed in 1963, “[Holmes] habitually upheld govern-
ment action by pointing to the most general powers that government had already
exercised, giving little indication of how the Court might determine the limits of
those powers, and sometimes leaving it unclear whether any such limits existed.”37
Holmes was, in all likelihood, focused on judicial power at the time he wrote to
Beveridge because he had some doubts about applying the Thayerian method to
laws that restricted speech.38 He had just heard arguments in Schenck v. United States,
a landmark case in which the Court considered a First Amendment challenge to the
speech-restrictive Espionage Act of 1917.39 And only months earlier, in the summer
of 1918, Judge Learned Hand debated him over the extent to which judges should
use their power in free speech cases.40 Unlike most judges of the time, who agreed
with the premises of judicial supremacy,41 Hand was a Thayerian who believed
Congress should interpret the Constitution for itself.42 But during his debate with
Holmes, he advocated for a modification of Thayer’s method.43 In reviewing a
statute that criminalizes speech, he maintained, the question is not what a legislative
majority could reasonably understand free speech to be, but rather what a person he
36 Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
37 Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 254,
305–06 (1963).
38 “It is noteworthy that in Thayer’s day no significant free speech or press litigation had
reached the Supreme Court,” government professor Wallace Mendelson once observed.
Mendelson, supra note 14, at 77. “Thus he had no empirical grounds for considering a
judge’s role in that context.” Id.
39 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–49 (1919).
40 See generally Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722–45 (1975); Frederic R.
Kellogg, Learned Hand and the Great Train Ride, 56 AM. SCHOLAR 471, 478–86 (1987).
41 Keith E. Whittington, Give “The People” What They Want?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
911, 918–20 (2006) (saying that between Abraham Lincoln’s and Franklin Roosevelt’s
respective presidencies, judicial supremacy was the dominant view); see also William F.
Swindler, Book Review of Judge Learned Hand and the Federal Judiciary, 15 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 755, 758 (1974) (noting that Hand was opposed to the judicial activism of the
Warren Court).
42 See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 52 (1994)
(“[T]here is no doubt that . . . [my views on constitutional law] are [Thayer’s] get.” (quoting
Letter from Learned Hand to A. James Casner (Nov. 10, 1959))); see also Edward A. Purcell,
Jr., Learned Hand: The Jurisprudential Trajectory of an Old Progressive, 43 BUFF. L. REV.
873, 884–926 (1995) (reviewing GUNTHER, supra note 42 (discussing Thayer’s influence on
Hand’s ideas about judicial review and noting differences)).
43 See Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes (late Mar. 1919), in GUNTHER,
supra note 42, at 758, 758–59.
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considered to be enlightened and judicious could reasonably understand it to be.44
It was, in effect, a countermajoritarian approach to freedom of expression.45
So when Hand made his case to Holmes over the course of two letters, he argued
for a wide power of judicial review in free speech cases.46 In the first letter, Hand
argued that the majority of people cannot understand the value of opinions they dis-
agree with.47 Most people are such “poor . . . creature[s],” he maintained, they cannot
conceive of their “opinions” as being anything less than “absolutes.”48 Then in the sec-
ond letter, Hand offered a rationale as to why judges should push back on the popular
disregard for opposing views.49 Unless judges restrain the common bias against
dissent, he explained, speech-related prosecutions will tend to “intimidate,—throw a
44 In Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (1917), Hand announced a direct-advocacy test
“[w]hen the question is of a statute constituting a crime.” Id. at 542. That is, “[c]ould any
reasonable man say . . . that the language directly advocated [the violation of law]?” Id. Later,
in a March 1919 letter, Hand told Holmes that judges should use his direct-advocacy test in
cases like Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)—which involved statutory crimes and
speech—because juries are excitable and “clannish,” and because they “won’t much regard”
the subtleties of a more nuanced test. Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes
(late Mar. 1919), supra note 43, at 758–59. Then, in a parting shot, Hand reminded Holmes
that jury members were not judges’ peers. “[A]re they societates perfectae?” he asked. Id. at 759.
45 Law professor Vincent Blasi has pointed out that in Masses, Hand treated free speech as
“a procedure essential to constituting a legitimate majority.” Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand’s
Seven Other Ideas About the Freedom of Speech, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 717, 719 (2018) (emphasis
omitted). The effect of such a procedure, however, would be to place a limit on what the
majority can do. At any rate, there is no record of Hand making the procedural argument in
his subsequent debate with Holmes, even though Holmes told Hand he had read Masses. See
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (Feb. 25, 1919), in GUNTHER, supra
note 42, at 758, 758. Holmes may have rejected the procedural argument in an unrecorded
conversation as “strik[ing] at the sacred right to kill the other fellow when he disagrees.”
Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes (June 22, 1918), in GUNTHER, supra note
42, at 755, 756. See generally Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15,
1916), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1935, at 18, 18–19 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (abr. by Alger
Hiss) [hereinafter 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS] (“Law also as well as sovereignty is a fact. If
in fact Catholics or atheists are proscribed and the screws put on, it seems to me idle to say
that it [ought not be] because [it goes against] a theory that you and I happen to hold . . . .”).
46 As I argue in Part II, Part III, and in the Conclusion, Holmes announced that he had
changed his mind about free speech in November 1919 when he dissented in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919). Soon thereafter, Hand sent Holmes a third letter in which
he praised his Abrams dissent. See Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes
(Nov. 25, 1919), in GUNTHER, supra note 42, at 760, 760–61. In this Article, however, I
focus on the free speech ideas Hand presented to Holmes before his Abrams reversal.
47 Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes (Nov. 25, 1919), supra note 46,
at 760, 760–61.
48 Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes (June 22, 1918), supra note 45,
at 755–56.
49 Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes (late Mar. 1919), supra note 43,
at 758, 758–59.
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scare into,—many a man who might moderate the storms of popular feeling.”50 Hand’s
basic message to Holmes, then, was that free speech in a Thayerian constitutional
order presented a practical problem that lent itself to a practical solution.
Yet despite Hand’s best efforts, Holmes seemingly dismissed his perspective
without a second thought. “[F]ree speech,” he bluntly told Hand, “stands no differ-
ently than freedom from vaccination.”51 In either case, he was convinced legislative
majorities should have their way.52 To define free speech in a countermajoritarian
fashion, Holmes argued a few years earlier, would be “logically indefensible.”53 As
Hand would soon realize, Holmes’s instincts were set against making any changes
to the Thayerian method in free speech cases.54 So it must have surprised Hand when,
late the following year—in an Espionage Act case called Abrams v. United States55—
Holmes abandoned his Thayerian approach to free speech questions in order to endorse
a countermajoritarian view.56 It was, in fact, a revolution in his understanding of judi-
cial power that no one could have predicted,57 including perhaps even Holmes himself.
50 Id. at 759. In his first letter, Hand offered an additional rationale for protecting dissent:
future developments could always make dissenting views look better. See Letter from
Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes (June 22, 1918), supra note 45, at 755–56. Hand,
however, abandoned that argument by the time he wrote his second letter. See Letter from
Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes (late Mar. 1919), supra note 43, at 758, 758–59
(declining to repeat his rationale from June 1918).
51 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in GUNTHER,
supra note 42, at 756, 757. In 1905, Holmes joined the Court’s decision in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, a case in which the Court upheld a Massachusetts measure requiring
vaccinations against smallpox. See 197 U.S. 11, 25–30 (1905).
52 See supra Introduction (“Holmes believed that when Congress passed a law, it had
every right to embody its own constitutional vision in that law.”); see also text accompanying
notes 2–36.
53 Thomas Healy, The Justice Who Changed His Mind: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and
the Story Behind Abrams v. United States, 39 J.SUP.CT.HIST. 35, 45 (2014) (quoting Chauncey
Belknap, Unpublished Diary Entry (Oct. 21, 1915)).
54 Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes (late Mar. 1919), supra note 43,
at 758 (prefacing his disagreement with Holmes’s approach to free speech law by saying it
was “positively [his] last appearance in the role of liberator”).
55 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
56 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas O’Fallon Memorial Lecture on
Law and American Culture: Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 71 OR. L. REV. 521, 533
(1992) (saying that in Abrams, Holmes first endorsed the countermajoritarian idea that judges
should protect dissenters). However, in the past few decades, a minority of commentators have
disagreed with the notion that Abrams represented a transformation in Holmes’s thought. For
a discussion of the debate, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Supreme Court Opinions: Experimenting
with Freedom, in THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE AND READER 262,
295–99 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2010); Stephen M. Feldman, Free Speech, World War I,
and Republican Democracy: The Internal and External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
192, 193–94 (2008).
57 Holmes never explained his Abrams transformation to anyone. See DAVIDM.RABBAN,
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 355 (1997).
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As Holmes admitted to British political theorist Harold Laski over a decade after his
Abrams reversal, “I think the argument for free speech . . . is not entirely easy.”58
Others, to be sure, have noticed that Abrams represents a transformation in
Holmes’s understanding of judicial power.59 Why, recently asked the Cato Institute’s
Ilya Shapiro and Michael Collins, did “Holmes put aside his majoritarian impulses
to support a constitutional restriction on legislative action [in Abrams and related
cases]”?60 “That question,” law professor Thomas Healy wrote in 2014, “is one of
the great legal and intellectual mysteries of the twentieth century.”61
Previous investigations of Holmes’s Abrams transformation have sensibly con-
sidered whether and to what extent a number of his friends and acquaintances influ-
enced him.62 After all, in the year and a half leading up to Abrams, Hand and a few
others pressed Holmes on the need for a broad power of judicial review in free speech
cases.63 But given that those investigations have had little success in identifying a
specific reason for Holmes’s change of heart,64 I have taken a different approach.
In researching Holmes’s reversal on the issue of free speech, I paid particular
attention to Holmes’s course of self-education in the months leading up to Abrams.
58 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (May 18, 1930), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI,
1916–1935, at 320, 320 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (abr. by Alger Hiss) [hereinafter
2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS].
59 See, e.g., Healy, supra note 53, at 73 (“Prior to [Abrams, Holmes] had been willing to
accept governmental suppression of speech as simply another instance of the majority’s right to
sacrifice the interests of the individual. From Abrams onward, however, he viewed speech . . .
as a privileged activity that was protected from governmental regulation . . . .”).
60 Ilya Shapiro & Michael T. Collins, Opinion, A Centenary for Free Speech, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 7, 2019, 5:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-centenary-for-free-speech-115
73167328 [https://perma.cc/WW9H-PMQ7].
61 Healy, supra note 53, at 36.
62 See, e.g., RABBAN, supra note 57, at 350–55; ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT
VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 77–79 (2000); Feldman, supra
note 56, at 229–31; Steven J. Heyman, The Dark Side of the Force: The Legacy of Justice
Holmes for First Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 661, 679–80
(2011); Healy, supra note 53, at 55–72.
63 See generally THOMAS HEALY, THEGREATDISSENT:HOWOLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 1–197
(2013) (discussing events leading up to Holmes’s Abrams reversal).
64 See, e.g., RABBAN, supra note 57, at 350 (“[S]o many factors . . . might have influ-
enced [Holmes to change his mind in Abrams].”); ALSCHULER, supra note 62, at 77 (arguing
that old age as well as “[s]everal voices may have contributed to” Holmes’s Abrams trans-
formation); Feldman, supra note 56, at 229 (“No precise [reason] can be given [for Holmes’s
Abrams reversal].”); Heyman, supra note 62, at 679 (“Although the causes of [Holmes’s
Abrams] transformation have always been something of a mystery, several factors seem to
have played a role.”); Healy, supra note 53, at 73 (arguing that Holmes’s “experience of
debating the issue of free speech and watching his young friends attacked for their views . . .
pushed” Holmes to change his approach to free speech in Abrams).
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And what I found was a strong case that the decisive factor in his reversal was his
reaction to a heretofore overlooked New Republic article entitled Mr. Burleson,
Espionagent,65 which examined Postmaster General Albert Burleson’s censorship
of the mail during World War I.66
But before I explain why it makes sense to conclude that Holmes reacted to
Espionagent by endorsing a countermajoritarian right to free speech, I begin, in Part I,
with a discussion of Holmes’s free speech rhetoric after Abrams. I will demonstrate,
for the first time, that Holmes’s free speech rhetoric during that period closely tracks
that of H.L. Mencken67—the ultralibertarian68 critic and newspaperman69—in his
1919 book Prejudices: First Series (“Prejudices”).70 My purpose in doing so is to
provide a sense of the free speech climate around the time of Abrams, and to show
how Holmes thought of free speech in the wake of Abrams.
Then, in Part II, I present my first of two arguments that Holmes’s reaction to
Espionagent explains his Abrams transformation. I will show that in Schenck Holmes
was not concerned with keeping official versions of truth in check, whereas eight
65 William Hard, Mr. Burleson, Espionagent, NEW REPUBLIC, May 10, 1919, at 42. I am
not aware of any scholar who has identified Holmes’s reaction to Espionagent as being the
decisive factor in his Abrams transformation. However, two scholars who have written about
Holmes’s Abrams opinion have discussed his reaction to Espionagent. See Anthony Gengarelly,
The Abrams Case: Social Aspects of a Judicial Controversy—Part II, 25 BOS. BAR J., Apr.
1981, at 9, 11; David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 174–75 (1982).
66 See generally Hard, supra note 65.
67 I am not aware of any scholar who has argued that Mencken’s free speech rhetoric
influenced Holmes’s.
68 See, e.g., H.L. Mencken, The Monthly Feuilleton, SMART SET, Dec. 1922, at 140 (“I am,
in brief, a libertarian of the most extreme variety . . . .”). In addition to libertarianism, Mencken
also believed in ordered social hierarchies. See, e.g., H.L. Mencken, The Mailed Fist and Its
Prophet, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1914, at 603 (praising Imperial Germany because there
“prizes went, not to those men who had most skill at inflaming and deluding the rabble, but
to those who could contribute most to the prosperity and security of the commonwealth”).
In 1926, journalist and political commentator Walter Lippmann criticized Mencken for
embracing both libertarianism and hierarchism: “The destruction of authority, of moral values,
of cultural standards is the result of [widespread] liberty . . . I am amazed that [Mencken]
does not see how fundamentally the spiritual disorder he fights against is the effect of that
regime of liberty he fights for.” Walter Lippmann, H.L. Mencken, SATURDAY REV. LIT-
ERATURE, Dec. 11, 1926, at 1, 414. Holmes would later express agreement with Lippmann’s
criticism. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (Sept. 18, 1927),
in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR
FREDERICK POLLOCK,1874–1932, at 205, 205 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) [hereinafter
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS].
69 See generally FREDHOBSON,MENCKEN:ALIFE (1994) (discussing Mencken’s life and
work).
70 H.L.MENCKEN,PREJUDICES:FIRSTSERIES (CreateSpace Indep. Publ’g Platform 2016)
(1919) [hereinafter PREJUDICES].
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months later in Abrams he was. The reason Holmes suddenly became concerned with
truth and authority, I will contend, is that Espionagent made him worry that legislative
majorities might someday clamp down on what the intellectual elite could read and say.
Finally, in Part III and in the Conclusion, I present my second of two arguments
that Espionagent sparked Holmes’s Abrams reversal. I will demonstrate, for the first
time, that Holmes considered an empathetic impulse he called the democratic feeling
to be an important precondition for liberty.71 But after he read Espionagent, he became
convinced that the country had temporarily lost sight of that impulse. So when he
considered the Abrams case, he proceeded as though the legislative coalition behind
the Espionage Act had actually wanted to protect a countermajoritarian right to free
speech all along. In effect, Holmes bet on the idea that Americans were fundamen-
tally decent and generous.
Given that Holmes’s Abrams dissent now defines the beginning of modern free
speech law,72 I conclude that there is good reason to think that history has vindicated
Holmes’s faith in the American people.
I. MENCKEN’S IDEA OF FREE SPEECH
Although Holmes never admitted to being influenced by Mencken’s Prejudices,
in this Part, I will identify a number of factors that make that influence all but certain.
Most importantly, Holmes made arguments in multiple opinions that fit neatly with
the free speech commentary within the book’s pages. And even though Holmes’s
Abrams conversion came just before his encounter with Prejudices, it pretty clearly
influenced his thinking moving forward.
In the dead of January 1920, Holmes spent his evenings listening to his wife,
Fanny Dixwell Holmes, read while he played solitaire.73 It was, by all accounts, a
time-honored pastime in the Holmes household.74 On this occasion, Fanny read
Mencken’s breakout book Prejudices75—a collection of highbrow essays into which he
had “insert[ed] some rat-poison.”76 Although Holmes would qualify his estimation
71 I am not aware of any scholar who has specifically connected Holmes’s notion of the
democratic feeling—as I describe it in Part III and in the Conclusion—with his notion of liberty.
72 See, e.g., David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1303 (1983).
73 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 28, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 181, 181.
74 WHITE, supra note 13, at 108.
75 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 28, 1920), supra note 73, at
181; see MARIONE. RODGERS,MENCKEN:THE AMERICANICONOCLAST 197 (“Within weeks,
Prejudices became a sensation on both sides of the Atlantic.”); TERRY TEACHOUT, THE
SKEPTIC: A LIFE OF H.L. MENCKEN 161 (2002) (saying that Prejudices raised Mencken’s
profile considerably).
76 RODGERS, supra note 75, at 196 (quoting Letter from H.L. Mencken to Ernest Boyd
(June 6, 1919)).
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of Mencken in the coming years,77 his response to Prejudices was positively effusive.
“I took malevolent pleasure in . . . Prejudices,” he told Laski soon after he and Fanny
finished the book.78 “[Mencken] I suspect would prove more or less a Philistine at
bottom, but Lord with what malevolent joy do I see him smash round in the china
shop . . . .”79 “He wiped off [poet] Amy Lowell in a way that seemed to me deserved;
and he takes [writer] George Ade seriously which again I like.”80 “With various
foibles,” Holmes concluded after processing the book for a few weeks, “he has a
sense of reality and most of his prejudices I share.”81
When Holmes encountered Mencken in early 1920, he had for some time been
dealing with the fallout from the 1919 Espionage Act cases—a series of cases,
including Abrams, in which the Court rejected First Amendment challenges to the
Act.82 One of those cases in particular, Debs v. United States,83 must have weighed
heavily on his mind.84 The Debs case centered on a speech given by powerful labor
leader and Socialist Party activist, Eugene V. Debs, as the First World War raged
on.85 The government argued that Debs’s speech violated two clauses of the Espio-
nage Act which addressed causing insubordination and obstructing the recruiting
services of the armed forces.86 In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Debs argued that
77 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Nov. 1, 1926), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 58, at 117, 117 (“I have read what I didn’t care for in [Mencken]
but I took much pleasure in a volume of Prejudices.”); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes
to Frederick Pollock (Sept. 18, 1927), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 68, at
205, 205 (“Walter Lippmann’s . . . criticisms of . . . Mencken I thought A-1.”).
78 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Feb. 10, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 183, 184.
79 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 28, 1920), supra note 73, at 181.
80 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Feb. 10, 1920), supra note 78,
at 184.
81 Id. When Mencken’s diary was unsealed and published decades after his death, it
became clear that he had a long history of using racial and ethnic slurs. See, e.g., Charles A.
Fecher, Firestorm: The Publication of HLM’s Diary, 113 MENCKENIANA 1, 1–7 (1990);
Vincent Fitzpatrick, After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness?, 66 VA.Q.REV. 514, 516–18
(1990). However, there is no evidence that Holmes knew about that side of Mencken.
82 In this Article, I discuss four of the five 1919 Espionage Act cases. I discuss (1)
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), in Part II; (2) Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919), in Part II; (3) Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), in Part I and Part II;
and (4) Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), in Part II, Part III, and the Conclusion.
The Court dismissed a fifth 1919 Espionage Act case—Sugarman v. United States—for lack
of jurisdiction. See 249 U.S. 182, 185 (1919).
83 249 U.S. 211.
84 Three years after writing his Debs opinion, Holmes told Laski: “I . . . was glad at the
release of Debs [from prison] . . . .” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski
(Jan. 15, 1922), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 305, 305–06.
85 See Debs, 249 U.S. at 212–16; ERNEST FREEBERG, DEMOCRACY’S PRISONER: EUGENE
V. DEBS, THE GREAT WAR, AND THE RIGHT TO DISSENT 7–23, 67–82 (2008) (discussing
Debs’s reputation and his Canton speech).
86 Debs, 249 U.S. at 212.
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those clauses violated the First Amendment.87 Holmes, however, writing for a unani-
mous Court, rejected Debs’s argument.88 “If a man thinks that in time of war the
right of free speech carries the right to try to impede by discourse the raising of
armies,” Holmes later explained to law professor John Henry Wigmore, “I am con-
tent to . . . say you . . . had better not monkey with the buzz saw.”89
The Debs case was, according to law professor G. Edward White, “the cause
célèbre of the Espionage Act cases.”90 It was, in the words of historian Robert Murray,
nothing short of “spectacular.”91 A hero to both organized labor and socialists,92 Debs
received “almost one million votes” in the 1920 presidential election, despite running
his campaign from prison.93 Although most of the country both opposed Debs and
approved of Holmes’s Debs opinion,94 Holmes soon began to complain of receiving
“stupid letters of protest” from Debs’s supporters.95 “The Debs case,” Holmes told
Wigmore, “seems to have let loose every damned fool in the country.”96 But Holmes’s
critics did not stop there. Just before May Day in 1919, followers of anarchist Luigi
Galleani attempted to mail bombs to Holmes and thirty-five of their other perceived
enemies.97 Although six bombs were delivered, the one intended for Holmes was not.98
“I suppose it was the Debs incident,” Holmes wrote to Laski, “that secured me the
honor of being among those destined to receive an explosive machine, stopped in the
Post Office as you may [have] seen. It shows a want of intelligence in the senders.”99
87 Id. at 212, 215.
88 Id. at 216–17.
89 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Henry Wigmore (June 7, 1919) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php
/item/43024949/13 [https://perma.cc/H92F-YAGF].
90 WHITE, supra note 13, at 419.
91 ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919–1920, at
23 (1955).
92 See, e.g., FREEBERG, supra note 85, at 7–23 (describing Debs’s work as a union leader
and socialist activist).
93 GEOFFREY R.STONE,PERILOUSTIMES:FREESPEECH IN WARTIME:FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 198 n.* (2004).
94 MURRAY, supra note 91, at 25–26.
95 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 5, 1919), in 2HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 68, at 7, 7; see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Lewis Einstein (Apr. 5, 1919), in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF
MR.JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN1903–35, at 184, 184 (James Bishop Peabody ed.,
1964) [hereinafter THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS] (“I am receiving some singularly ignorant
protests against a decision that I wrote sustaining a conviction of Debs, a labor agitator, for
obstructing the recruiting service.”).
96 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Henry Wigmore, supra note 89.
97 See CHARLES H. MCCORMICK, HOPELESS CASES: THE HUNT FOR THE RED SCARE
TERRORIST BOMBERS 8, 36–37 (2005).
98 See id. at 36–37.
99 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (May 1, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 149, 149.
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Given Holmes’s engagement with free speech issues just before Fanny read
Prejudices, it is no wonder that he seemed to pay particular attention to the book’s
scattered polemics against the free speech climate of the time—an era, of course,
that was defined by the First World War and the First Red Scare, when the country
was ruled by fear.100
Those attacks on the prevailing idea of free speech, for instance, played a sig-
nificant role in The Genealogy of Etiquette, an essay about the work of psychologist
Elsie Clews Parsons.101 There, Mencken highlighted Parsons’s thesis that “[t]he safety
of human society lies in the assumption that every individual composing it, in a given
situation, will act in a manner hitherto approved as seemly.”102 When someone instead
acts in a “novel manner,” Mencken reported Parsons to have argued, “he . . . forces
[those around him] to meet the new situation he has created by the exercise of in-
dependent thought. Such independent thought, to a good many men, is quite impos-
sible, and . . . extremely painful.”103
After presenting Parsons’s doctrine, Mencken immediately used it to launch an
attack on democratic habits of thought and behavior.104 “[P]eople in the mass,”
Mencken protested, “cannot understand innovations that are genuinely novel and
they don’t want to understand them; their one desire is to put them down.”105 “[T]he
revolutionist in custom,” Mencken went on,
is opposed by a horde so vast that it is a practical impossibility
for him, without complex and expensive machinery, to reach and
convince all of its members, and even if he could reach them he
would find most of them quite incapable of rising out of their
accustomed grooves.106
“[I]t is the distinguishing mark of democratic societies,” Mencken decided in the
end, “that they exalt the powers of the majority almost infinitely, and tend to deny
the minority any rights whatever.”107
Holmes, for his part, registered his agreement only a year later, in the 1921 case
United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson.108
100 See generally ANN HAGEDORN, SAVAGE PEACE: HOPE AND FEAR IN AMERICA, 1919
(2007); MURRAY, supra note 91.
101 MENCKEN, The Genealogy of Etiquette, in PREJUDICES, supra note 70, at 79, 79–89.
The essay was first published as H.L. Mencken, The Genealogy of Etiquette, SMART SET,
Sept. 1915, at 304.
102 MENCKEN, supra note 101, at 85.
103 Id. at 86.
104 Id. at 86–87.
105 Id. at 87.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 255 U.S. 407, 436–38 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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In Burleson, a socialist daily called the Milwaukee Leader sued Postmaster General
Burleson because he ordered the revocation of its second-class mail privileges,
which were defined in the Act of March 3, 1879.109 Burleson’s reason for issuing the
order was that, in the past, the newspaper had run articles that were “nonmailable”
within the meaning of the Espionage Act.110 The Milwaukee Leader challenged
Burleson’s order, in part, by arguing that it violated its First Amendment right to
free speech.111 Nevertheless, a majority of the Court ruled that Burleson’s order was
“amply justified.”112
Holmes, however, could not agree.113 In making his case, Holmes’s reasoning
ran parallel with Mencken’s Parsons article. Holmes first echoed Mencken’s point
that a dissenter is effectively silenced without access to an expansive communica-
tions system.114 “[T]he use of the mails,” Holmes asserted, “is almost as much a part of
free speech as the right to use our tongues.”115 Then, mirroring Mencken’s condemna-
tion of democratic societies on the grounds that they are poor guardians of counter-
majoritarian rights, Holmes criticized the idea that the Espionage Act authorized
Burleson’s action.116 Because “the power claimed by the Postmaster could [easily]
be used to interfere with very sacred rights,”117 he explained, “it would take very
strong language to convince me that Congress ever intended to give such a practically
despotic power to any one man.”118 As a result, Holmes concluded that Burleson’s
“refusal to allow” the newspaper to receive “the rate to which it was entitled . . . was
unjustified by statute and was a serious attack upon [fundamental] liberties.”119
109 See Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 180, 20 Stat. 355, 358 (1879).
110 Burleson, 255 U.S. at 408–09 (majority opinion); see Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40
Stat. 553, 554 (amending Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. XII, 40 Stat. 217, 230).
111 Burleson, 255 U.S. at 409. The Milwaukee Leader’s other arguments against
Burleson’s order were that “it [did] not afford [the newspaper’s owner] a trial in a court of
competent jurisdiction[;] . . . [it] is destructive of the rights of a free press, and deprives [the
newspaper’s owner] of [their] property without due process of law.” Id.
112 Id. at 415.
113 See id. at 436–38 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
114 See id. at 437–38.
115 Id. at 437. Holmes, however, had expressed concern about “the enormous powers
exercised by the post office” as early as 1914. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Edward
Ross (May 20, 1914) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.har
vard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/43026634/5 [https://perma.cc/C85Y-MMSZ]; see also
sources cited infra note 119 (addressing Holmes’s attitude toward Post Office fraud orders).
116 Burleson, 255 U.S. at 437.
117 Id. at 438.
118 Id. at 437.
119 Id. at 438. Similarly, in the 1922 case Leach v. Carlile, Holmes thought two mail fraud
laws violated the First Amendment in large part because the Post Office was “the principal
means of speech with those who are not before our face.” 258 U.S. 138, 140–41 (1922)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Privately, Holmes thought the mail fraud laws had “been an instru-
ment of more or less tyranny.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock
(Feb. 26, 1922), in 2HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 68, at 89, 90. “[The] post office
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A few years later, in another free speech case, Holmes again took a Menckenian
turn. In the Parsons essay, soon after discussing the barriers to being a cultural
innovator in America, Mencken maintained—rather flamboyantly—that Americans
hate new ideas.120 “The whole political history of United States is the history of . . .
three ideas,” each of which is “unsound,” he wrote.121 To wit, “there is the funda-
mental idea” that the “exercise” of political power “by superior men is intrinsically
immoral[;] . . . there is the primary doctrine that the possession of great wealth is a
crime . . . [and] there is the ineradicable peasant suspicion of the man who is having
a better time in the world.”122 Because Americans find genuine innovations to be
“incomprehensible [and] alarming,” Mencken added, they continuously back
political movements that place “extra-gaudy label[s]” on their old sacred cows.123
Those worn-out notions, Mencken charged, are behind “the whole gasconade of
‘reform’ politics,” from “trust-busting” to racist demagoguery, as well as “the glit-
tering pearls of the uplift, from Abolition to Prohibition.”124
After attacking Americans’ inability to get beyond their “circle of . . . elemental
convictions,”125 Mencken went on to make a heated case against the American
approach to free speech. Vladimir Lenin’s Bolsheviks, Mencken wrote—at a time
when they were, without a doubt, public enemy number one126—actually agreed with
the American idea of free speech.127 In fact, he continued, the Bolsheviks understood
the American idea of free speech more clearly than Americans did.128 “Once they were
in the saddle,” Mencken said, they “put the [American] principle into plain words.”129
[T]hey decreed the abolition of the old imperial censorship and
announced that speech would be free henceforth—but only so
long as it kept within the bounds of the Bolshevist revelation! In
other words, any citizen was free to think and speak whatever he
pleased—but only so long as it did not violate certain fundamental
ideas. This is precisely the sort of freedom that has prevailed in
the United States since the first days. It is the only sort of free-
dom comprehensible to the average man. It accurately reveals
fraud orders,” he told Laski in 1922, “[have] been on my conscience for years.” Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 11, 1922), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS,
supra note 45, at 313, 314.
120 MENCKEN, supra note 101, at 87.
121 Id at 88.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 87–88.
124 Id at 88.
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., HAGEDORN, supra note 100, at 345; MURRAY, supra note 91, at 166.
127 MENCKEN, supra note 101, at 89.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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his constitutional inability to shake himself free from the illogi-
cal and often quite unintelligible prejudices, instincts and mental
vices that condition ninety per cent. of all his thinking . . . .130
In the 1925 case Gitlow v. New York, Holmes similarly described Americans as
being narrow-minded and incapable of understanding freedom of expression.131 The
Supreme Court in Gitlow considered an appeal from Benjamin Gitlow, a radical
member of the Socialist Party,132 who had been convicted of “criminal anarchy”
under New York’s Criminal Anarchy Law of 1902 for publishing a document called
The Left Wing Manifesto.133 In the document, Gitlow “advocated . . . mass industrial
revolts[,] . . . mass political strikes[,] and ‘revolutionary mass action’, for the
purpose of . . . destroying the parliamentary state and establishing in its place . . . a
‘revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.’”134 Although the Court majority voted
to uphold Gitlow’s conviction,135 Holmes refused to lend them his support.136
Holmes began his dissent by attacking the majority’s belief that Gitlow’s mani-
festo used “the language of direct incitement” rather than the language of mere
“philosophical abstraction” or cold-headed prognostication.137 “Every idea is an
incitement,” Holmes objected.138 The real issue before the Court, Holmes continued,
was whether there was a genuine likelihood that Gitlow’s document would be “acted
on.”139 Then, without providing any reasons, Holmes definitively shut down the
possibility that Gitlow’s manifesto posed such a threat.140 “[W]hatever may be
thought of the redundant discourse before us,” Holmes announced, “it had no chance
of starting a present conflagration.”141 Apparently, Holmes thought it was obvious that
the great majority of Americans had zero interest in Gitlow’s exotic message. The
country, he believed, was deeply set against what he had to say.142 So in its basic logic,
Holmes’s assumption recalled Mencken’s description of Americans as being reliably
hidebound and reactionary.
130 Id.
131 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
132 See id. at 655 (majority opinion).
133 Id. at 654–55.
134 Id. at 657–58 (quoting The Left Wing Manifesto, REVOLUTIONARY AGE, July 5, 1919).
135 Id. at 672.
136 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 665 (majority opinion).




142 See also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Feb. 10, 1918), in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 95, at 160, 161 (“I hardly think [the] chaos [of the
Russian Revolution] is to be apprehended here.”); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Harold Laski (Sept. 17, 1920), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 222, 222 (“I
cannot believe . . . this country will repeat [the Russian Revolution].”).
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Then, in a final rhetorical flourish, Holmes presented a formulation of free speech
that directly responded to Mencken’s complaint that even Lenin could endorse the
American idea of free speech. “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community,”
Holmes announced, “the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given
their chance and have their way.”143 Holmes’s understanding of free speech, then,
was the clear inverse of Mencken’s accounting of the American concept. Whereas
Mencken believed that Congress and the courts had effectively confined free speech
to a narrow range of sanctioned principles, Holmes thought the right to free speech
should protect those who defied the conventional wisdom. As Holmes later ex-
plained his Gitlow opinion to diplomat Lewis Einstein, “[T]he usual notion is that
you are free to say what you like if you don’t shock me. Of course the value of the
constitutional right is only when you do shock people.”144
In Prejudices, after winding down his attack on the American idea of free speech
in the Parsons essay, Mencken picked it back up in An Unheeded Law-Giver,145 an
essay in which he lamented Ralph Waldo Emerson’s relative lack of influence on
American culture.146 “One discerns, in all right-thinking American criticism,” Mencken
began, cautiously enough, “the doctrine that . . . Emerson was a great man.”147
Emerson, he acknowledged, has always been hailed as the “spokesman . . . of bold
and forthright thinking, [and] of the unafraid statement of ideas.”148 But lurking just
below the surface of all the high-minded praise, Mencken continued, lay a troubling
problem. “What one notices about him chiefly is his lack of influence upon the main
stream of American thought, such as it is. He had admirers and worshippers, but no
apprentices.”149 None of Emerson’s stateside followers, Mencken regretted to say,
143 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673. In 1992, Grey noted that in Gitlow, “[p]rotection of free
discussion, even against the short-term majority, . . . became an aspect of a long-term
commitment to majority rule itself.” Grey, supra note 56, at 533. But, he continued, “Holmes
offered no argument to justify the presumption in favor of a potential long-term majority over
the actual short-term one that had decreed the restriction of speech in question.” Id. That
problem dissolves away, however, when you consider that, in Gitlow, Holmes was not making
a point about majoritarianism, but was instead echoing Mencken’s rhetoric.
144 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (July 11, 1925), in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 95, at 243, 244.
145 MENCKEN, An Unheeded Law-Giver, in PREJUDICES, supra note 70, at 102, 102–04.
The essay was first published as H.L. Mencken & George Jean Nathan, The Puritan Plato,
SMART SET, July 1919, at 66.
146 MENCKEN, supra note 145, at 102. Aside from discussing the pressing topic of free
speech, Mencken’s An Unheeded Law-Giver would have caught Holmes’s attention because
it dealt with Emerson, who was Holmes’s only lifelong hero. See Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 20, 1930), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note
68, at 264, 264.
147 MENCKEN, supra note 145, at 102.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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has ever executed [his] command to “defer never to the popular
cry.” On the contrary, it is precisely within the circle of
Emersonian adulation that one finds the greatest tendency to test
all ideas by their respectability, [and] to combat free thought as
something intrinsically vicious . . . . [T]he country of this
prophet of Man Thinking is precisely the country in which every
sort of dissent from the current pishposh is combated most fero-
ciously, and in which there is the most vigorous existing tendency
to suppress free speech altogether.150
“[I]t would surely be absurd to hold,” Mencken observed at last, “that [Emerson] has
colored and conditioned the main stream of American thought . . . .”151
Holmes, for his part, expressed similar sentiments in the 1929 case United States
v. Schwimmer.152 There, the Supreme Court considered a petition for naturalization
filed by a Hungarian national named Rosika Schwimmer.153 Under the Naturaliza-
tion Act of 1906, Schwimmer was required to take an “oath . . . [to] support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies.”154 A district
court, however, rejected her petition155 because, as an avowed pacifist, she was un-
willing to “take up arms in defense of [the] country.”156 A majority of the Court agreed
with the district court’s denial.157 According to the majority, “a fundamental principle
of the Constitution” is that citizens have a duty, when necessary, “by force of arms
to defend our government.”158
Holmes, however, saw the Constitution differently. He argued that if the Con-
stitution stood for anything, it stood for the principle Mencken admired in Emer-
son—that is, the idea that people should be free to think for themselves.159 Although
Schwimmer’s beliefs may “excite popular prejudice,”160 Holmes wrote in his dissent,
the “foundation of the Constitution”161 rests beyond the reach of popular opinion.
“[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for
150 Id. at 103.
151 Id. at 104.
152 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
153 Id. at 646.
154 Id. (quoting the Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596, 598).
155 Id. at 646.
156 Id. at 647.
157 Id. at 650.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 654–55 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 654. In a letter to Laski, Holmes suggested that his observation about Schwimmer’s
unpopular views included, at least in part, “her somewhat flamboyant declaration that she
was an atheist.” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (June 15, 1929), in 2
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 58, at 270, 271.
161 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Apr. 13, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 58, at 263, 263.
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attachment than any other[,] it is the principle of free thought,” Holmes argued.162
“[N]ot free thought for those who agree with us[,] but freedom for the thought that
we hate. I think that we should adhere to that principle with regard to admission into,
as well as to life within this country.”163
So by 1929, it seems, Holmes had completely fallen in line behind the free speech
rhetoric Mencken had advanced in Prejudices. Like Mencken, Holmes argued that
dissenters should have access to effective communications systems. Like Mencken,
Holmes argued that free speech protections should extend to genuinely novel ideas.
And like Mencken, Holmes argued that attacks on free thought should be put down. On
free speech matters, Thayer’s venerable disciple had echoed the polemics of an ultra-
libertarian editorial writer. It was a development that was, by any measure, unimagin-
able as late as November 9, 1919, the day before Holmes issued his Abrams dissent.164
II. THE SCHENCK AND ABRAMS CASES
“In his post-Abrams free speech opinions,” White observed in 1993, “Holmes
regularly adopted speech-protective positions and thereby cemented his reputation
among commentators as a libertarian on free speech issues.”165 Yet before Abrams,
Holmes’s understanding of free speech was very different. As Schenck shows, he did
not think of free speech as a right that was meant to “hobble . . . the majority,” as
Mencken would have had it.166 Instead, he thought of free speech as a set of activi-
ties that happened to exist beyond the reach of legislative power.167 In this Part, I will
track Holmes’s transformation after Schenck by doing two things. First, I will outline
Holmes’s Thayerian understanding of free speech in Schenck.168 Then, I will describe
how Holmes understood free speech in Abrams, the first opinion in which he endorsed
a countermajoritarian right to free speech.169 In Abrams, I will show Holmes was
influenced by Hand’s basic idea of modifying Thayer’s method on pragmatic grounds.
162 Schwimmer, 279 U.S. at 654–55.
163 Id. at 655.
164 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
165 WHITE, supra note 13, at 436–37.
166 H.L. Mencken, Mr. Justice Holmes, AM. MERCURY, May 1930, at 122–23. See gen-
erally RABBAN, supra note 57, at 131 (explaining “[t]hroughout the period from the Civil
War to World War I, the overwhelming majority of decisions in all jurisdictions rejected free
speech claims, often by ignoring their existence. . . . No court was more unsympathetic to
freedom of expression than the Supreme Court, which rarely produced even a dissenting
opinion in a First Amendment case”).
167 As political science professor H.L. Pohlman explained in 1991, “[Holmes] defined free
speech negatively, not positively . . . . What constituted free speech was what was left over.”
H.L. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: FREE SPEECH AND THE LIVING CON-
STITUTION 10 (1991). Pohlman, however, does not think Holmes changed his mind about free
speech in Abrams. See id. at 255.
168 See generally Collins, supra note 56, at 95–219 (discussing Holmes’s free speech
jurisprudence before Schenck).
169 See Grey, supra note 56, at 533.
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In Schenck, the Justice Department accused two Socialist Party officials—
Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer170—of printing and distributing circulars to a
number of men who had been drafted under the Selective Service Act of 1917.171
Those circulars, the Justice Department charged, were “calculated to cause . . . in-
subordination and obstruction” in the armed forces.172 A jury eventually convicted
Schenck and Baer of conspiring to violate Title I, Section 3 of the Espionage Act,173
which made it illegal, “when the United States is at war,” to “willfully cause or attempt
to cause insubordination . . . in the military or naval forces of the United States, or [to]
willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States.”174 Schenck’s
and Baer’s appeals to the Supreme Court relied, in part, on the First Amendment.175
In his opinion for the Court, Holmes reduced the case to two issues, both of
which fit comfortably into his habit of thinking about legislative authority. The first
issue was whether Congress had the power to prohibit conspiracies to obstruct the
recruiting service.176 Holmes resolved the issue by relying on two decisions he had
joined the previous year.177 In Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases)—a
decision which addressed a handful of similar cases—Chief Justice Edward Douglass
White ruled that the Selective Draft Act was within Congress’s power under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, which includes its power to declare war and to raise
and support armies.178 And in Goldman v. United States, White ruled that a crime could
result from an unsuccessful conspiracy to “induce persons” to “fail[] to register” for
the draft when the Selective Draft Act required them to do so.179 Taken together, the
170 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919); see Collins, supra note 56, at
219–20 (discussing the defendants in Schenck).
171 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49–51. See generally Selective Service Act of 1917, ch. 15, 40
Stat. 76 (1917).
172 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
173 See id. at 48–49.
174 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917). The jury also con-
victed Schenck and Baer of “conspir[ing] to . . . use the mails” to distribute those circulars,
which they deemed to be “nonmailable” under Title 12, Section 2 of the Act, and of “unlawful
use of the mails.” Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49; see also Espionage Act of 1917 at 230–31.
175 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49. Schenck and Baer also argued that there was insufficient
evidence that they conspired to distribute the circulars. Id. Holmes rejected that argument.
Id. at 49–50. In addition, Schenck and Baer “objected that the documentary evidence was not
admissible because obtained upon a search warrant, valid so far as appears.” Id. at 50.
Holmes rejected that argument as well. Id.
176 See id. at 52–53.
177 In Schenck, Holmes specifically relied on White’s 1918 opinion in Goldman v. United
States. See id. at 52 (citing Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918)). In Goldman, in
turn, White relied in part on his own earlier 1918 opinion in Arver v. United States. See
Goldman, 249 U.S. at 476 (citing Arver v. United States (Selective Draft Law Cases), 245
U.S. 366 (1918)).
178 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 377 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
179 Goldman, 245 U.S. at 475, 477 (citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78,
85–86 (1915)).
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Selective Draft Law Cases and Goldman stood for the idea that Congress had the
power to prohibit conspiracies to obstruct the draft, even if those conspiracies were
not ultimately successful.
So when Holmes considered the first issue in Schenck—whether Congress had
the power to prohibit conspiracies to obstruct the recruiting service—he thought the
answer was obvious: Congress had such power.180 It did not matter that the Selective
Draft Act addressed obstructions of the draft while the Espionage Act addressed
obstructions of the recruiting service.181 “[R]ecruiting[,]” Holmes reasoned, “is
gaining fresh supplies for the forces, as well by draft as otherwise.”182
Then, after determining that Schenck’s and Baer’s activities amounted to a con-
spiracy to obstruct the recruiting service,183 Holmes went on to address the second
issue: whether their particular conspiracy was protected by the First Amendment.184
Notably, when Holmes tackled the second issue, his analysis did not begin with the
right to free speech. He did not, in other words, identify the extent to which the First
Amendment protected opposition to the recruiting service.185 Instead, in keeping with
his longstanding Thayerianism, he focused on Congress’s authority.186 For Holmes,
resolving the free speech issue meant deciding whether Schenck’s and Baer’s
activities fell inside or outside Congress’s power to prohibit conspiracies to obstruct
the recruiting service.187
180 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52–53.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 53. Privately, Holmes justified the Title I, Section 3 clauses at issue in Thayerian
terms. As he shared with Laski in May 1919:
I think the clauses under consideration [in Schenck and Debs] not only
were constitutional but were proper enough while the war was on.
When people are putting out all their energies in battle I don’t think it
unreasonable to say we won’t have obstacles intentionally put in the
way of raising troops—by persuasion any more than by force.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI
LETTERS, supra note 45, at 152, 153 (emphasis omitted) (enclosed in a letter to Harold Laski,
dated May 13, 1919).
183 In Schenck, Holmes reduced the Goldman holding (that a crime could result from an
unsuccessful conspiracy to induce persons to fail to register for the draft) to a compressed
formula: “If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which
it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making
the act a crime.” Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. And after looking at the facts in Schenck, Holmes
thought that formula applied: “[T]he document would not have been sent unless it had been
intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have
upon persons subject to the draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.”
Id. at 51.
184 See id. at 51–52.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 52.
187 See id.
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As in Hammer—in which Holmes ruled on whether a law fell within Congress’s
Commerce Clause power without identifying the limits of that power—Holmes’s
approach to the question of whether Congress had the power to punish Schenck’s and
Baer’s conspiracy demonstrated a disinclination to create broad legal distinctions.
“[Holmes] does not think it is possible,” law professor Zechariah Chafee reported in
the fall of 1919,188 not long after chatting with him about the law of free speech,189 “to
draw any limit to the First Amendment but simply to indicate cases on the one side or
the other of the line.”190 Holmes resolved the constitutional question before him in
Schenck, then, as if it were a single data point that would inevitably be joined by
many more.
“We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying
all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights,”
Holmes began.191
But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done. . . . When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort
that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and
that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitu-
tional right.192
In just a few broad strokes, then, Holmes had placed the circulars within Congress’s
power to prohibit conspiracies to obstruct the recruiting service, and outside the
protection of the First Amendment. Schenck’s and Baer’s free speech argument, he
believed, had to fail.
Despite the similarities between Hammer and Schenck, however, they differed
in a big way. In Hammer, Holmes understandably had nothing to add after resolving
the dispute before him. But in Schenck, he tacked on an ambitious second act;
incredibly, he set out to alter the judiciary’s entire approach to mediating between
legislative power and the right to free speech.193 In the half-century before Schenck,
law professor David Rabban has explained:
188 DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 30
(1986) (quoting Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr. to Charles F. Amidon (Sept. 30, 1919)).
189 See HEALY, supra note 63, at 154–59 (describing the events leading to and the events
of the day of a July 1919 meeting between Chafee and Holmes at the summer residence of
Harold Laski).
190 Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr. to Judge Charles F. Amidon (Sept. 30, 1919), supra
note 188.
191 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
192 Id.
193 See HEALY, supra note 63, at 243 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (June 12, 1922)) (saying that he “thought . . . out” the free speech
framework he laid out in Schenck “unhelped”).
2020] THE PURE-HEARTED ABRAMS CASE 477
The most pervasive and fundamental judicial approach to free
speech issues . . . used the bad tendency test derived from Sir
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the English common
law in the eighteenth century. Many decisions . . . followed
Blackstone’s conclusion that the legal right of free speech pre-
cludes prior restraints, but permits the punishment of publica-
tions for their tendency to harm the public welfare.194
And so the targets of Holmes’s second act were Blackstone’s prior restraints doctrine
and bad-tendency test—both of which were ubiquitous, and both of which Holmes
had previously “taken . . . as well founded.”195 Although by 1922 Holmes could not
remember who had “taught” him Blackstone was mistaken, he recalled being con-
vinced nonetheless.196
In upending Blackstone, Holmes began by casually brushing aside the doctrine
of prior restraints. “It well may be that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom
of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have
been the main purpose . . . .”197 Then, with a simple decree, he replaced Blackstone’s
deferential bad tendency test198 with a more demanding guideline, his famous clear-
and-present-danger framework.199 “The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,”
Holmes began.200
It does not even protect a man from [a labor] injunction [on the
theory that his] words . . . may have all the effect of force. . . .
The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
194 RABBAN, supra note 57, at 132.
195 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Zechariah Chafee (June 12, 1922), supra note
193, at 243; see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (“[T]he main purpose
of [the rights of free speech and a free press] was to prevent . . . ‘previous restraints’ upon
publications . . . but not to prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed
contrary to the public welfare.”) (emphasis omitted).
196 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,supra note 193, at 243.
197 See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51–52.
198 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 13, at 350 (describing the bad tendency test as a “standard
of judicial review [that] was minimal”).
199 See Thomas Healy, Anxiety and Influence: Learned Hand and the Making of a Free
Speech Dissent, 50 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 803, 804 (2018) (“[I]n the months immediately fol-
lowing World War I, [Holmes] mov[ed] from the conservative Blackstonian position . . . to
the then-radical position that speech is protected unless it poses a clear and present danger.”).
Some commentators, however, do not believe that Holmes’s clear-and-present-danger test
significantly altered the bad tendency test. For a discussion of the debate, see Collins, supra
note 56, at 229, 260.
200 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
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clear and present danger that they will bring about the substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.201
Unsurprisingly, Holmes’s newly established framework did little to curtail
legislative power. “When [Holmes] chose the uncertain metric of ‘clear and present
danger,’” Rogat once observed, “his deference to dominant social forces prevailed.”202
Rather than establishing a sharp line that Congress could not cross, Holmes’s frame-
work merely set up hazy guideposts for deciding, in future cases, whether particular
words in particular cases ran afoul of Congress’s rightful authority. Any application
of the clear-and-present-danger framework, Holmes explained in Schenck, “is a ques-
tion of proximity and degree.”203
A week after deciding Schenck, on March 10, 1919, Holmes handed down opinions
for the Court in two more Espionage Act cases, Frohwerk v. United States204 and Debs
v. United States.205 In both cases, Holmes upheld convictions under Title I, Section 3,206
just as he had done in Schenck. And in both cases, Holmes rejected free speech ob-
jections by relying on his free speech analysis in Schenck.207 That being so, it would
be reasonable to assume that Holmes would continue to rely on Schenck moving
forward—especially in a case like Abrams, which he considered only eight months
later, and which involved another free speech challenge to Title I, Section 3.208 But
in Abrams, of course, he rethought his entire approach to free speech law.
Perhaps the most conspicuous feature of Abrams—in part because it is entirely
missing from Schenck—is Holmes’s focus on the benefits of free speech.209 After
201 Id. (citation omitted).
202 Yosal Rogat & James M. O’Fallon, Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion—The
Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1382 (1984) (describing the significance of Holmes’s
clear-and-present-danger framework before Abrams); see also Gunther, supra note 40, at 736
(“Holmes, at the time of Schenck . . . , is revealed as . . . blind[] to any justification for
curtailing majority suppression of dissent.”).
203 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
204 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
205 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
206 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205, 206–10; Debs, 249 U.S. at 212, 215–17. In Frohwerk, a
newspaper editor named Jacob Frohwerk was convicted of violating Title I, Section 3 on
twelve separate occasions, and of conspiring to violate it. See Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 205. In
Debs, Debs was also convicted of violating Title I, Section 3. See Debs, 249 U.S. at 212.
207 Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 206–09; Debs, 249 U.S. at 215; see also Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919), supra note 182, at 152, 153 (“The
constitutionality of the [Espionage Act] so far as the clauses concerning obstructing the
recruiting service are involved was passed upon in Schenck v. U.S. and so all that was needed
in the Debs case was to refer to that decision . . . .”).
208 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 616–17 (1919). The provisions at issue in
Abrams, however, were added by an amendment to the Espionage Act called the Sedition
Act of 1918. See Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (amending Espionage Act of
1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219).
209 See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 66 (2001) (noting that in
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arguing that “truth” amounts to whatever propositions have at least some popular
support, Holmes maintained that that notion of truth “is the only ground upon which
[our] wishes safely can be carried out.”210 According to law professor Vincent Blasi,
with that comment, Holmes revealed that he was worried “about the risk of desires
being thwarted by wielders of power who” rely on “some [alternative] notion of
truth.”211 Holmes’s interest in truth and authority is all the more remarkable because
it did not seem to stem from the Abrams case at all. Far from having any authority,
the Abrams defendants212 were struggling young activists who promoted the cause
of Bolshevism.213 They were, in other words, marginal people who hawked a widely
despised philosophy.214
Holmes’s newfound concern with truth and authority was most likely sparked
by the New Republic’s May 10, 1919, article Espionagent.215 In the article,216 journalist
William Hard examined the phenomenon of Burleson exercising his power under
the Espionage Act, as amended by the Sedition Act of 1918,217 to censor the mail
“[w]hen the United States is at war.”218 Burleson, Hard was unhappy to report, had not
shirked his duties.219 When particular facts clashed with the government’s version
of reality, he did not hesitate to wipe them out.220 Not even George Washington was
safe from his eraser.221 But in carrying out his duties, Hard explained, Burleson’s
actions fell entirely “within our spirit and within our law.”222 Not only did the courts
“approve[] Mr. Burleson,” Hard pointed out, but the country “applauded [him]. For
one letter coming to Washington resenting suppressions of speech, there were ten
Schenck, Holmes identified “just the costs of free speech,” while in Abrams he “can be seen
sketching in the other side of the cost-benefit algorithm”).
210 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
211 Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The Abrams Dissent,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1349 (1997).
212 Although the Abrams defendants were technically “plaintiffs in error,” both Clarke and
Holmes settled on calling them “defendants.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616 (majority opinion);
id. at 628–29, 631 (Holmes, J., dissenting). I follow their lead.
213 See id. at 618–22 (majority opinion); id. at 625–26 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
214 See RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND FREE SPEECH 4–27, 139–47, 154–96 (1987) (describing the defendants in
Abrams at length).
215 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919), supra note
182, at 152 (discussing Espionagent).
216 See generally Hard, supra note 65.
217 See Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (amending Espionage Act of 1917, ch.
30, 40 Stat. 217).
218 Id. at 554.
219 See Hard, supra note 65.
220 See id. at 42–44 (listing and describing print media deemed non-mailable by Post-
master General Albert Burleson).
221 See id. at 43.
222 See id. at 42.
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urging more suppressions.”223 If anything, Hard concluded, Burleson’s behavior
simply uncovered a bug in the administration of any program designed to control
thought.224 While “[c]ensorship may start as the creature of popular impulse,”225
Hard argued, it inevitably “finishes by making thought. . . . We end by being all of
us outwitted by the officeholders.”226
Soon after reading the article, Holmes admitted to Laski, “Few can sympathize
more than I do with Mr. Hard’s general way of thinking on the subject.”227 The story
of Burleson must have caught Holmes’s attention because he had always prized
intellectualism above all else.228 There were certain “ideas that make life worth
living,” he told British jurist Frederick Pollock in 1929,229 and “[i]t is proper that a
gentleman should have read certain books before he dies.”230
In the years leading up to Hard’s article, however, Holmes felt “a vague apprehen-
sion” that those ideas would be “dimmed and diminished” by the political movements
he saw bubbling up all around him.231 “[O]h how little I care for the . . . trend . . . to
make other people better,” Holmes told Laski in late 1916, “with teetotalism and
white slave laws that make felons of young men . . . for crossing a state line with a
girl.”232 “[W]e are learning,” he told his friend Clara Sherwood Stevens months
earlier, “that most great things are done by . . . the despotism of a dominant gener-
ally accepted ideal that does not tolerate difference and laughs at free speech—The
Catholic Church—The Puritans—Islam—these did things.”233 Holmes’s fear was so
223 Id.
224 See id. at 44–45.
225 Id. at 44.
226 Id. at 45.
227 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919), supra note 182,
at 152.
228 See LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES 14–16, 21–71 (1991) (describing Holmes’s intellectual life).
229 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 5, 1929), in 2HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 68, at 238, 239.
230 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Feb. 10, 1908), in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 95, at 33, 33; see also MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS, 1841–1870, at 71 (1957) (quoting Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Albert Beveridge (Feb. 8, 1927) and Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Albert Beveridge (Nov. 17, 1926)) (saying the South’s elite during the Civil War
“knew nothing of the ideas that make the life of the few thousands that may be called civilized”
and calling Southerners “usually half-educated”).
231 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Feb. 10, 1918), supra note 142,
at 160, 161.
232 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Dec. 13, 1916), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 30, 30.
233 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Clara Sherwood Stevens (Feb. 9, 1916) (on file
with the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php
/item/43026648/32 [https://perma.cc/37L9-CW2N].
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present to his mind that in 1928, when he reviewed a labor group’s report on the
Soviet Union, his instinct was to see in it the lesson that the ideas he lived for could
be made officially infamous in short order:
Perhaps it comes down to the question . . . of what kind of world
you want. Personally I do not prefer a world with a hundred mil-
lion bores in it to one with ten. The fewer the people who do not
contribute beauty or thought, the better to my fancy. I perfectly
realize that the other fellers feel otherwise and very likely would
prefer to get rid of me and all my kind. Perhaps they will . . . as
I suppose they did in Russia.234
Heading into Abrams, then, it made sense that Holmes would have truth and authority
on his mind. Hard’s article confirmed what he had already been feeling. Legislative
majorities, whether by design or by unintentional overreach, might someday find a
way to suffocate his life and the lives of those he most respected.
Abrams involved five young radicals—Jacob Abrams, Hyman Lachowsky, Samuel
Lipman, Hyman Rosansky, and Mollie Steimer—all of whom had emigrated from
Russia.235 The record in the case showed that in the summer of 1918, they had “united
to print and distribute” two circulars, one in English and one in Yiddish.236 The English
circular criticized President Woodrow Wilson’s silence about America’s role in the
international military intervention in the ongoing Russian Revolution, and advanced
the idea that capitalism and German militarism were the common enemies of both
“workers” and the Bolsheviks.237 The Yiddish circular, meanwhile, warned “[w]orkers”
and Russian immigrants that it harmed the Bolshevik cause when they bought war
bonds or worked in armament factories, and called for a general strike in response
to the Russian intervention.238
After investigating the group’s activities, the Justice Department charged each
of the five with four counts of violating Title I, Section 3 of the Espionage Act, as
amended by the Sedition Act of 1918,239 and a jury convicted them on all counts.240
However, both Justice John Hessin Clarke, writing for the majority, and Holmes,
writing in dissent, focused their attention on the third and fourth counts, which they
234 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (July 8, 1928), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 58, at 219, 220.
235 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919); POLENBERG, supra note 214,
at 145–46. A sixth defendant—Jacob Schwartz—died the night before the trial began, and
a seventh defendant—Gabriel Prober—was acquitted at trial. See id. at 88, 138.
236 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 618; see id. at 619–22 (discussing the circulars at issue).
237 See id. at 619–20.
238 See id. at 620–22.
239 See id. at 616–17. See generally Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (amending
Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219).
240 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616–17.
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agreed were the strongest.241 The third count alleged a conspiracy “to encourage re-
sistance to the United States” in the war with Germany, and “to attempt to effectuate
the purpose by publishing” both circulars.242 And the fourth count alleged a “conspiracy
to incite curtailment of production of things necessary to the prosecution of the war”
with Germany, and “to attempt to accomplish it by publishing” the Yiddish circular.243
In their appeal to the Court, the defendants’ “chief[]” argument was that “there
[was] no substantial evidence in the record to support” their convictions, and that,
as a result, the trial judge “erroneously denied” their motion for a directed verdict.244
In response, Holmes considered the narrow issue of whether there was evidence that
the group’s activities fell within the prohibitions of the Title I, Section 3 clauses on
which the third and fourth counts were based.245 Although the majority ruled that
there was “much persuasive evidence . . . before the jury tending to prove that the
defendants were guilty as charged in both the third and fourth counts of the indict-
ment,”246 Holmes disagreed. Given the record, he did not think it was possible for
anyone to convict the five radicals on either count.247
Holmes began his analysis by noting that the two Title I, Section 3 clauses at
issue required an intent to interfere with the war against Germany.248 And as a matter
of statutory interpretation, Holmes believed the term intent had to be understood “in
a strict and accurate sense.”249 The intent required by the statute, Holmes argued, is
an “intent to produce a consequence . . . [that] is the aim of the deed.”250 So when
Holmes considered whether any evidence supported convictions under the third and
fourth counts, he looked for proof that the defendants’ “proximate motive” was to
interfere with the war against Germany.251 But he found none.252 As he explained his
241 Id. at 623–24; id. at 626 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The first count alleged “a conspiracy
pending the war with Germany to publish abusive language about the form of government
of the United States.” Id. at 624. The second count alleged “a conspiracy pending the war to
publish language intended to bring the form of government into contempt.” Id.
242 Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 624–25.
244 Id. at 619 (majority opinion).
245 See id. at 626–29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 624 (majority opinion).
247 See id. at 626–29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
248 See id. at 626, 629. See generally Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (amending
Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219).
249 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
250 Id.
251 Id. at 627–629.
252 See id. at 628–29. Holmes buttressed his reasoning with an additional argument addres-
sing each of the third and fourth counts. The third count depended, in part, on whether the
defendants “encourage[d] resistance” to the war effort. Id. at 624. The term resistance, in
turn, appeared in the Espionage Act. See Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (amend-
ing Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219). As a matter of statutory
interpretation, Holmes thought the term resistance meant “some forcible act of opposition.”
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting). However, he did not think there was any
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reasoning to Pollock shortly after writing his dissent, “[A]n actual intent to hinder
the U.S. in its war with Germany must be proved. . . . [I]t seems to me plain that the
only object of the leaflets was to hinder our interference with Russia.”253
After answering the defendants’ evidentiary argument, Holmes could have easily
put his pen down. Once he decided the Espionage Act did not address their conduct,
after all, their convictions could not stand. Nevertheless, Holmes went on to address
a second argument the five had only “somewhat faintly” put forward.254 Specifically,
they had argued that the “acts charged . . . were not unlawful because” they were pro-
tected by the First Amendment.255 Whereas Clarke promptly dismissed the argument
as having been “definitely negatived” by Schenck and Frohwerk,256 Holmes used it as
an occasion to announce how he would apply, from then on, the clear-and-present-
danger framework he had created.257 The framework, he contended, should be
applied in a way that advanced the rationality of a civilized person.258 On the issue
of free speech, the old Thayerian amazingly went to war for the enlightened few.
Holmes’s argument for taking the clear-and-present-danger framework from the
hands of legislative majorities was, at its core, an exercise in dissimulation. Holmes
began with his usual defense of the majority’s right to define free speech.259 “Perse-
cution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no
doubt of your premises or your power[,] and want a certain result with all your
heart[,] you naturally express your wishes in law[,] and sweep away all opposi-
tion.”260 But then he immediately responded to his settled view with a counterview.
evidence the defendants encouraged such resistance. Id. Meanwhile, the fourth count de-
pended, in part, on whether the defendants attempted to “incite curtailment of production of
things necessary” for the war effort. Id. at 625. Holmes argued that “[a]n actual intent . . . is
necessary to constitute an attempt, where a further act of the same individual is required to
complete the substantive crime.” Id. at 628 (citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375, 396 (1905)). However, he did not think there was any evidence the defendants acted
with such intent. Id.
253 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 14, 1919), in 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 68, at 32, 32; see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Harold Laski (Dec. 27, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 175, 175 (“It
was . . . necessary that the overt act laid should be proved to be done with intent to forward
a conspiracy to interfere with the war with Germany—and I thought it plain on the face of
the document that it was written [with another view].”).
254 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 618 (majority opinion).
255 Id. The five also argued that “the entire Espionage Act [was] unconstitutional.” Id. at
619. Clarke rejected that argument, id., while Holmes never addressed it.
256 Id.
257 See id. at 627–28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
258 See id. at 630.
259 See id.
260 Id.; see, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (July 7, 1918), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 116, 116 (repeating the argument); Letter from
Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 26, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKILETTERS,supra
note 45, at 165, 165 (making the same argument).
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In kicking off what has become one of “the most frequently quoted” passages in free
speech law,261 Holmes described how hypothetical people could come to value
tolerance more than democratic power:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market . . . .262
Because Holmes’s argument for tolerance echoed the ideas of British philosopher
John Stuart Mill263—and because Holmes reread Mill only months before Abrams264—
scholars have naturally assumed that he had finally moved toward Mill’s way of
thinking.265 His letters, however, prove otherwise. The famous justification for toler-
ance Holmes advanced in Abrams was a mere stand-in for his own.
261 Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment:
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 22 (1990). See generally Collins,
supra note 56, at 373–75 (examining the influence of Holmes’s marketplace-of-ideas concept
on the law of free speech).
262 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. Some commentators have taken issue with Holmes’s
marketplace metaphor because the market does not always produce truth. See, e.g., STEVEN
H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 6 (1999); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 26 (1993). Holmes, however,
simply wanted to combat official versions of truth by pushing for versions of truth that had
been “accepted in the competition of the market.” Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. As Blasi put it:
[A]lthough an open marketplace of ideas might not lead to truth, any
governmental intervention in the market is likely to exacerbate rather
than ameliorate the preexisting distortions. . . . [A] fully implemented
policy of selective suppression permits some orthodoxies to be per-
petuated in the face of the most irrefutable evidence of their falsity.
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH.
J. 521, 550 (1977).
263 See Irene M. Ten Cate, Speech, Truth, and Freedom: An Examination of John Stuart
Mill’s and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s Free Speech Defenses, 22 YALE J.L.&HUMANS.
35, 38 (2010) (noting the “similarities” between Mill’s justification for free speech in his
book, ON LIBERTY, and Holmes’s justification in Abrams). See generally JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 43 (2d ed. 1863) (“The beliefs which we have [the] most warrant for, have no
safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded.”).
264 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Feb. 28, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 138, 139.
265 See, e.g., Bogen, supra note 65, at 113 (saying that Mill’s “views . . . bec[a]me im-
portant to Holmes’[s] view of free speech”); Michael F. Duggan, The Municipal Ideal and the
Unknown End: A Resolution of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 83 N.D. L. REV. 463, 521 (2007)
(“[Holmes] seems to have . . . [adopted] a version of Mill’s marketplace of ideas.”); Healy, supra
note 199, at 823–25 (arguing that Mill influenced Holmes’s justification for free speech).
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Both before and after Abrams, Holmes subjected proposed truths to two related
tests, neither of which appears in his dissent.266 The first test was straightforward;
it merely asked what, at any moment, could he not help but believe.267 That test, in
turn, verified his personal “can’t helps.”268 By contrast, Holmes’s second test of truth
required a more delicate social calculation. As he explained to philosopher M. C.
Otto in 1929, “When I go beyond my [personal] can’t help[s] in saying a thing is true,
I mean that I believe that in the long run those who are as civilized and intelligent
as I am will believe it.”269 And those beliefs, he told Einstein in 1913, are “the can’t
helps that are common to what we consider the better part of the human race.”270
Given that Holmes’s real social test of truth used elite opinion as a reference
point (rather than a general competition of the market), his argument for preferring
tolerance to democratic power takes on a whole new significance. “[N]otice how
large a part of the fighting faiths of men depend on men having been shaped by
them for a considerable time,” he explained to Einstein in 1913,271 “before [they]
ever heard [them] questioned.”272 “[F]allacies that one would think . . . [were]
smashed a century ago,” he told his friend Nina Gray a year later, “are the breath of
the nostrils for politicians.”273 Although Holmes realized that elite opinion did not
266 See supra note 253 and accompanying text. In a 1929 letter to philosophy professor
M.C. Otto, Holmes plainly outlined his two tests of truth. Notes and News, 38 J. PHIL. 389,
391–92 (1941) (citing Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to M.C. Otto (Sept. 26, 1929)).
However, I am not aware of any scholar who has noted that Holmes’s discussion of truth in
the letter clashes with the competition-of-the-market test of truth he set out in Abrams.
267 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (June 17, 1908), in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 95, at 34, 36; Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes
to M.C. Otto (Sept. 26, 1929), supra note 266, at 391.
268 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (June 17, 1908), supra note 267,
at 36; see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to M.C. Otto (Sept. 26, 1929), supra note 266,
at 391.
269 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to M.C. Otto (Sept. 26, 1929), supra note 266, at 392.
270 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Nov. 9, 1913), in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 95, at 81, 82 (italics removed).
271 Id.
272 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Alice S. Green (Nov. 9, 1913), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 4, at 22, 23. An unpublished interpretation of Holmes’s handwritten
November 9, 1913 letter to Einstein uses similar language: “[N]otice how large a part of the
fighting faiths of men depend on men having been shaped by them for a considerable time
before they ever heard [them] question[ed].” Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis
Einstein (Nov. 9, 1913), supra note 270.
273 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Nina Gray (Sept. 22, 1914) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/4288
0820/13 [https://perma.cc/CD66-4SHB]; see Letter from Chauncey Belknap to Mark Howe
(Apr. 12, 1963) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu
/suites/owh/index.php/item/43123800/12 [https://perma.cc/UJP8-C834] (enclosing Belknap’s
transcription of his shorthand notes for his Justice Holmes’s conversation) (“This country has
been engaged in defying facts in every tack we take for the last twenty years.”).
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always win the day, he thought it exerted a positive influence on popular opinion.274
“[W]ith effervescing opinions, as with the not yet forgotten champagnes,” he told
the Harvard Liberal Club in 1920, “the quickest way to let them get flat is to let them
get exposed to the air.”275 In Abrams, then, Holmes must have advocated for tolerance
in order to protect the intellectual elite.
Once Holmes had set up tolerance as more important than democratic power,
he injected that value system into the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.276
Taking a page from Chafee’s law review article Free Speech in Wartime—which he
had come across only months before277—Holmes insisted that the First Amendment
“is a declaration of a national policy in favor of the public discussion of all public
questions”278:
Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of
the country. . . . Only the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time war-
rants making any exception to the sweeping command, “Con-
gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”279
Having thus set the stage for a wide power of judicial review in free speech cases,
Holmes reaffirmed his clear-and-present-danger framework,280 before announcing
274 In a 1912 letter to Charles Owen, Holmes wrote, “The test of truth, I used to say, is the
majority vote of that nation that can lick all others. But it is the majority vote in the long
run—and as to that we have to rely for consolation upon a few, at times.” Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Charles Owen (Feb. 5, 1912) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/43026615/6 [https://perma
.cc/2AQQ-M98V]. In his 1918 article Natural Law, however, Holmes watered down the
same point:
I used to say, when I was young, that truth was the majority vote of that
nation that could lick all others. . . . I think that the statement was
correct in so far as it implied that our test of truth is a reference to
either a present or an imagined future majority in favor of our view.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
275 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Harvard Liberal Club, in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 137 (1936) [here-
inafter JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES]; see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919), supra note 182, at 153 (“[I]n the main I am for aeration of all
effervescing convictions—there is no way so quick for letting them get flat.”).
276 For further discussion as to how Holmes justified arguing that the Constitution enacted
a policy of tolerance, see infra Part III and the Conclusion.
277 See HEALY, supra note 63, at 157–58.
278 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in Wartime, 32 HARV.L.REV. 932, 934 (1919).
279 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend I).
280 See id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I do not doubt for a moment that . . . the
United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a
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how he thought it should be applied in the case before him.281 And his approach, it
turns out, conformed to his long-held view that civilized people are those who “tran-
scend[ their] own dogmas” as a matter of course282:
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immedi-
ate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law
that an immediate check is required to save the country.283
So even though Holmes continued to stand by his clear-and-present-danger frame-
work, including the case-by-case methodology it entailed,284 he had planted his own
flag firmly on the side of tolerance. While other judges may do what they may,
Holmes would demand that challenged legislation conform to the rationality of a
civilized person.
In applying his newly minted civilized-person standard to the case before him,
Holmes wasted no time in gutting the count he considered to have the most merit—the
fourth count285—which alleged a conspiracy and attempt “to incite curtailment of
production of things necessary to the prosecution of the war” with Germany.286
Under the civilized-person standard, Holmes reasoned, the circular on which the
count was based—the Yiddish circular287—was protected by the First Amendment.
clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.”).
281 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Albert Beveridge (Dec. 8, 1919) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item
/42976633/39 [https://perma.cc/4P3L-DGZE] (“I thought . . . it was my duty and my right to
state what I thought the limits were to the [clear-and-present-danger] doctrine . . . .”); Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 14, 1919), supra note 253, at 32 (“I
thought it proper to state what I thought the limits of the [clear-and-present-danger] doctrine.”).
282 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Ethel Scott (Nov. 28, 1908) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/4302
6637/19 [https://perma.cc/FDA8-ZRM9]; see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts,
10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915) (“To have doubted one’s own first principles is the mark of a
civilized man.”).
283 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
284 See id. at 627 (“I never have seen any reason to doubt that the questions of law that alone
were before this Court in the case[] of Schenck . . . were rightly decided.”); see also Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John C.H. Wu (Dec. 2, 1922), in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, supra note 275, at 154, 156 (saying, after Abrams, that “the law is full of instances
where a man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . some matter of degree”).
285 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 14, 1919), supra note 253,
at 32 (“I think it possible that I was wrong in thinking that there was no evidence on the Fourth
Count in consequence of my attention being absorbed by the two leaflets that were set forth.”).
286 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624–25 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
287 See id. (“The fourth count lays a conspiracy to incite curtailment of production of
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“Now nobody can suppose that the surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an
unknown man, without more, would present any immediate danger that its opinions
would hinder the success of the government arms or have any appreciable tendency
to do so.”288 As a result, Holmes concluded that “the defendants were deprived of
their rights under the Constitution of the United States.”289
By responding to the problem of truth and authority in a Thayerian constitu-
tional order with a countermajoritarian right to free speech, Holmes made it clear
that he had finally accepted Hand’s basic idea of modifying Thayer’s method on
pragmatic grounds.290 In free speech cases, he decided at last, judges must use their
power to push back against laws that restricted speech.291 Otherwise, the country’s
best minds would find no shelter from the unpredictable and piercing winds of
democratic politics.292
III. THE DEMOCRATIC FEELING
Although Holmes’s Abrams reversal makes sense as a practical reaction to the
threat that speech-restrictive laws posed to the intellectual elite, there remains in his
opinion a second argument for a countermajoritarian right to free speech that leans
on his understanding of freedom itself. As I will show, Holmes considered an
empathetic impulse he called the democratic feeling to be an important precondition
for liberty. But after reading Espionagent, Holmes concluded that the country had
temporarily set that impulse to the side. As a result, in Abrams, Holmes acted on his
intuition that voters would yield to a countermajoritarian right to free speech if the
judiciary pushed them to do so. In this Part, I examine the democratic feeling, and
in the Conclusion, I explain how Holmes used the democratic feeling to support his
argument for a countermajoritarian right to free speech.
things necessary to the prosecution of the war and to attempt to accomplish it by publishing
the [Yiddish] leaflet . . . .”).
288 Id. at 628.
289 Id. at 631.
290 After Abrams, however, Hand was not satisfied with Holmes’s civilized-person
standard because it continued to rely on a case-by-case methodology. As he told Chafee in
1921, “I am not wholly in love with Holmesey’s test, . . . [for] [o]nce you admit that the
matter is one of degree . . . you give to Tomdickandharry, D.J., so much latitude . . . that the
jig is at once up. . . . I own I should prefer a qualitative formula, hard, conventional, difficult
to evade.” Letter from Learned Hand to Zechariah Chafee (Jan. 2, 1921), in GUNTHER, supra
note 42, at 769, 770.
291 See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630–31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
292 Holmes understood that democracies did not necessarily confine themselves to policies
he thought were acceptable. In December 1916, for instance, Holmes agreed with Laski’s
opinion that the “hideous . . . truth” is that democracy is not always “good.” Letter from
Harold Laski to Oliver Wendell Holmes (Dec. 8, 1916), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra
note 45, at 40, 41; see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Dec. 13, 1916),
supra note 232, at 30.
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In the summer of 1924, as Holmes enjoyed a break from the Court, jurist and
philosopher Morris Cohen thoughtfully sent him William Mackintire Salter’s Nietzsche
the Thinker: A Study293—a detailed restatement of Friedrich Nietzsche’s thought—
which Holmes quickly promised to read “with a reasonably docile mind.”294 Although
Holmes had read Nietzsche years earlier,295 Salter’s study paid particular attention
to Nietzsche’s politics, a theme Holmes had never before shown attention to.296 And
the Nietzsche Salter knew, Holmes soon discovered, was a truculent antidemocrat.297
Today “the idea of the individual’s importance and of equality [and] equal
rights,” Salter reported, “has taken political form in democracy.”298 But for Nietz-
sche, suffrage was far from a sparkling achievement. It was instead “a form of
decline . . . . [I]t represents a form of unbelief—unbelief in great men and a select
society.”299 Nietzsche thought the rise of democratic governments in the nineteenth
century meant “[a] more common kind of men are getting the upper hand . . . . They
have their place . . . in society, but they are a lower type of men, and when they wish
to order everything for their own benefit, their selfishness is . . . revolting . . . .”300
Whereas Salter’s reaction to Nietzsche’s imperiousness “had been . . . shock
after shock,”301 Holmes did not so much as wince. Soon after receiving Salter’s
study, Holmes confided to Laski, “[Nietzsche] moves some sympathy in me. Before
I knew him[,] if not before him[,] I used to say that equality between individuals, as
a moral formula, was too rudimentary.”302
As Holmes explained decades earlier in his The Use of Law Schools address, he
regretted to see that the country’s “passion for equality ha[d] passed far beyond the
293 WILLIAM MACKINTIRE SALTER, NIETZSCHE THE THINKER: A STUDY (1917); see Felix
Cohen, The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J.HIST.IDEAS 3, 40 (1948) (citing Letter from
Morris Cohen to Oliver Wendell Holmes (Aug. 18, 1924)).
294 Letter from Morris Cohen to Oliver Wendell Holmes (Aug. 18, 1924), supra note 293,
at 41.
295 In 1902 Holmes read two compilations of Nietzsche’s work, “including his Case of
Wagner, his Anti-Christ, his Genealogy of Morals, and his Poems.” 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK,
1874–1932, at 101 n.3 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942).
296 See Seth Vannatta & Allen Mendenhall, The American Nietzsche? Fate and Power in
the Pragmatism of Justice Holmes, 85 UMKCL.REV. 187, 193–94 (2016) (discussing Holmes’s
engagement with Nietzsche prior to his reading of Salter’s study).
297 See SALTER, supra note 293, at 425 (describing Nietzsche’s theory as the “extreme
antithesis of the democratic theory”).
298 Id. at 309.
299 Id. at 418 (quoting his personal translation of 8 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Götzen-
Dämmerung, in NIETZSCHE’S WERKE 151 (1899)).
300 Id. (quoting his personal translation of 11 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Nachgelassene
Werke, in NIETZSCHE’S WERKE 374 (1901)).
301 Id. at 1.
302 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Aug. 31, 1924), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 443, 444.
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political or even the social sphere.”303 Not only are we “unwilling to admit that any
class or society is better than that in which we move,” he added, “but our customary
attitude towards every one in authority of any kind is that he is only the lucky recipient
of honor or salary above the average.”304 Although he acknowledged that “the demo-
cratic feeling which will submit neither to arrogance nor to servility” is an important
“virtue[] of freemen,” he also believed it was equally important for Americans to be
“[m]odest[]” about their capacities and “reveren[t]” of those who were superior to
them.305 Democracy and social hierarchy, he thought, had to live side by side306:
[W]hen the passion for equality is not content with founding
social intercourse upon universal human sympathy, and a com-
munity of interests in which all may share, but attacks the lines
of Nature which establishes orders and degrees among the souls
of men—they are not only wrong, but ignobly wrong.307
Although Holmes consistently viewed people as falling along a hierarchy,308 he
was always capable of allowing himself to feel kind and sentimental towards others,
without regard to his opinion of their merits. Take, for example, Holmes’s view of the
South’s old ruling class. In 1927, when Holmes reviewed Beveridge’s draft biogra-
phy of Abraham Lincoln, he bristled at Beveridge’s suggestion that the South’s elite
were equals to the North’s elite.309 “I hope that time will explode the humbug of the
303 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Use of Law Schools, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES
OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 34, 36 (1962).
304 Id.
305 Id. at 37.
306 See id. at 36–37.
307 Id. at 37; see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (May 12, 1927),
in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 58, at 149, 149 (“[T]he passion for equality . . .
seems to me merely idealizing envy . . . .”); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis
Einstein (July 20, 1917), in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 95, at 143, 143
(“[T]he so-called passion for equality really is a passion for superiority . . . .”).
308 See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 43–44 (1881) (“[T]he
dogma of equality applied . . . to individuals only within the limits of ordinary dealings in
the common run of affairs.”); Benjamin G. Rader & Barbara K. Rader, The Ely-Holmes
Friendship, 1901–1914, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 128, 132 (1966) (quoting Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Richard T. Ely (Jan. 12, 1902)) (“[T]he equality of human individuals is
only a politeness of conversation due to the necessities of talk.”); Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Margaret Bevan (Sept. 7, 1913) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), http://
library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/43291246/9 [https://perma.cc/YS3Z
-9G5N] (“[T]he fiction of conversation like that of morals is that all are equally important.”).
309 See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Albert Beveridge (Apr. 16, 1927) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index
.php/item/42976633/3 [https://perma.cc/E6YN-QBJA] (offering comments on Beveridge’s
ongoing “Life of Lincoln” project).
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Southern Gentleman in your mind,” he told Beveridge with an air of irritation.310
Recalling his experiences with the Confederate side when he fought for the Union,
Holmes explained that “southern gentlemen generally were an arrogant crew who
knew nothing of the ideas that make the life of the few thousands that may be called
civilized.”311 The Southerners he had encountered, he complained a few months
earlier, were “provincially arrogant, and . . . usually half-educated.”312
But when Holmes considered the personal qualities of the Southerners he had
come across during the Civil War, his distaste for their social traits and intellectual
culture quickly gave way to an admiring respect. “I have heard more than one of
those who had been gallant and distinguished officers on the Confederate side,”
Holmes said in an 1884 speech:
[S]ay that they [felt no personal hostility toward the Union side].
I know that I and those whom I knew best had not. . . . The ex-
perience of battle soon taught its lesson even to those who came
into the field more bitterly disposed. . . . You could not stand up
day after day in those indecisive contests where overwhelming
victory was impossible . . . without getting at least something of
the same brotherhood for the enemy that the north pole of a
magnet has for the south—each working in an opposite sense to
the other, but each unable to get along without the other.313
“The greatest qualities, after all,” Holmes concluded in another speech a month later,
“are those of a man, not those of a gentleman, and neither North nor South needed
colleges to learn them.”314
Holmes’s views of ordinary men and women likewise depended on the lens
through which he perceived them. On the one hand, he had a long history of viewing
everyday people as beneath him.315 Having decided in his youth that they were
“thick-fingered clowns,”316 by his mid-80s he hung onto the idea that they were of
310 HOWE, supra note 230, at 70 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Albert
Beveridge (Feb. 8, 1927)).
311 Id. at 71.
312 HOWE, supra note 230, at 71 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Albert
Beveridge (Nov. 17, 1926)).
313 OLIVERWENDELL HOLMES, Memorial Day, in THE OCCASIONALSPEECHES OF JUSTICE
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 303, at 4, 4–5.
314 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, Harvard College in the War, in THE OCCASIONAL
SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 303, at 17.
315 As Grey noted in 1992, Holmes often referred to ordinary people as the crowd, a phrase
which is “closer in connotation to ‘the mob’ than to ‘the people.’” Grey, supra note 56, at 526.
316 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Amelia Holmes (Nov. 16, 1862), in TOUCHED
WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 1861–64 at
70, 71 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946).
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“limited intellectual means.”317 The great majority of Americans, he told Laski in
1929, “live an essentially animal life . . .—and I know no a priori reason or neces-
sity for their not doing so.”318
Yet despite his low opinion of ordinary people, there were occasions on which
Holmes could be genuinely moved by their struggles and vulnerabilities. In 1906,
for example, after reading Jane Addams’s book Democracy and Social Ethics,
Holmes told economist Richard T. Ely, “Addams . . . gives me more insights into
the point of view of the working man and the poor than I had before. How excellent
her discrimination between doing good to them and doing good with them. I believe
with her that we need more democratic feeling . . . .”319 And a dozen years later,
Holmes recalled the democratic feeling he took from Addams’s book when he con-
sidered 17th century Dutch artist Adriaen van Ostade’s depictions of “the poor.”320
Holmes found one of Ostade’s etchings in particular, Saying Grace, to be particularly
moving.321 The etching, he told Laski, depicts “a peasant saying grace over his bowl
of porridge—his little boy to his right—wife and baby in the rear.”322 The image, he
continued, is “so simple, so unconscious, so immediately sympathetic. I mean you
don’t feel that Ostade was seeing himself sympathize.”323 “The line of devotion in the
little boy’s back,” he told Einstein a few months earlier, is so “tenderly given . . . ,
and the whole thing makes me want to cry.”324
It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that on the day Holmes circulated a draft of
his Abrams dissent to the other justices, he bought a picture that reminded him of
Saying Grace.325 All the available evidence, after all, suggests that while Holmes
317 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 1, 1925), in 2HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 68, at 172, 173.
318 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Dec. 18, 1929), in 2 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 58, at 297, 298.
319 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Richard T. Ely (June 18, 1906), in Rader &
Rader, supra note 308, at 137.
320 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Apr. 26, 1918), in THE
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 95, at 163, 164–65 (“[Ostade], in Jane Addams’
phrase, is good with the poor not to them.”).
321 Compare id. at 164 (identifying the etching as appearing “in Hind’s Short History of
Engraving and Etching, page 189”), with ARTHUR M. HIND, A SHORT HISTORY OF
ENGRAVING & ETCHING 189 (2d ed. 1911) (showing an image of an Ostade etching entitled
Saying Grace).
322 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 25, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 132.
323 Id.
324 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Apr. 26, 1918), supra note 320,
at 165; see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Jan. 24, 1919), in 2
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 68, at 3, 4 (“[Ostade’s Saying Grace] makes me
want to cry . . . .”).
325 Holmes sent his dissent out to the other justices on November 6, 1919. See HEALY,
supra note 63, at 213. On that same day, he told Gray that he bought an etching that reminded
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would have normally considered the Abrams defendants to be beneath him, when
he wrote his dissent, he saw them through the lens of the democratic feeling.
Nowhere in the Abrams case was Holmes the terrible, who, during oral argu-
ments in the Selective Draft Law Cases, “whisper[ed] to [his] neighbor on the bench”
that the draft’s anarchist opponents were “pig headed adherents of an inadequate
idea.”326 Nowhere was Holmes the hardhearted, who, in a letter to Laski, attacked
Debs as a fraud,327 even after agreeing that his prison sentence was “both cruel and
blind.”328 And nowhere was Holmes the pitiless, who, after seeing Gitlow carted off
to prison, regarded his defense of him “as simply upholding the right of a donkey to
drool.”329 All we get in Abrams is Holmes the crestfallen. Although he considered
the radicals’ political message to be “ignoran[t] and immatur[e,]”330 he never took the
next step, in his opinion or anywhere else, of belittling them for it. Instead, he only
saw the tragedy of their fate.
In his dissent, Holmes powerfully condemned the court system’s treatment of
the radicals. “[N]o one has a right even to consider [the defendants’ creeds] in dealing
with the charges before the Court,” Holmes wrote, yet they were “made the subject
of examination at the trial.”331 And following the tarnished trial, he continued, they
received decades-long prison sentences for making and distributing a couple of
circulars with the aim of changing the country’s foreign policy332—an endeavor
Holmes could only believe was hopeless.333 The entire affair, from prosecution to
sentencing, Holmes charged, had been senselessly cruel. “Even if . . . enough can
be squeezed from these poor and puny anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus
paper,” he protested, “the most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly
could be inflicted.”334 And because of that, he reasoned, the radicals simply could
him of Saying Grace. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Nina Gray (Nov. 6, 1919) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index
.php/item/43097582/3 [https://perma.cc/WK38-HY2N].
326 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Margaret Clifford (Dec. 18, 1917) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item
/42978025/4 [https://perma.cc/S2QS-DEP8].
327 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 15, 1922), supra note
84, at 305–06 (“I hardly can believe [Debs] honest . . . .”).
328 Editorial Note, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 19, 1919, at 362; see Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Harold Laski (Apr. 20, 1919), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at
197, 197 (expressing his agreement with the New Republic’s April 19, 1919 editorial note
about Debs’s sentence).
329 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (July 11, 1925), supra note 144,
at 244.
330 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629–30 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
331 Id.
332 Id. at 629.
333 Id. at 628 (arguing that the circulars could not have affected American foreign policy).
334 Id. at 629.
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not have been punished for “what the indictment alleges.”335 They were instead, unfor-
tunately, being “made to suffer . . . for the creed that they avow.”336 The image of
the United States breaking the lives of five powerless young people, merely for
being different, was too much for Holmes to pass silently over.
So after Holmes had determined that the Yiddish circular was protected by the
First Amendment, he closed his opinion with a humble confession: “I regret that I
cannot put into more impressive words my belief that[,] in their conviction upon this
indictment[,] the defendants were deprived of their rights under the Constitution of
the United States.”337 It was an apology that emphasized the tolerance he thought the
United States owed to the five defendants, but callously denied to them. And it was
an apology that expressed his genuine sorrow at that fact.
With the strand of his dissent that led to his confession, then, Holmes removed
all doubt about how he perceived the Abrams case. He took an interest in who the
defendants were, despite disagreeing with their ideas. He thought of them as signifi-
cant, even though they were rejected by mainstream society. And he approached
them “on a simply human basis, without” any thought as to whether they measured
up to his high standards.338 By modestly focusing on the defendants’ humanity, and
by unselfconsciously sympathizing with them, Holmes succeeded in replicating the
impulse he regarded as admirable in Democracy and Social Ethics, and that nearly
moved him to tears in Saying Grace.339 For Holmes, the Abrams case involved much
more than “simply a problem to be solved.”340 As he knew all too well, it involved
real people who really suffered.
CONCLUSION
On May 29, 1929, the New York Times, in an unattributed editorial, heaped
praise on Holmes for his then-recent dissent in Schwimmer.341 By insisting that the
Constitution embodied a national policy of tolerance, the Times writer extravagantly
boasted, Holmes revealed once again that he owned “one of the deepest, subtlest,
most massive and courageous of judicial intellects.”342 “We know from the experi-
ences of the late war that any dissemination of [Schwimmer’s] views at the wrong
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id. at 631.
338 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (May 7, 1930), in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 95, at 308, 309.
339 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Richard T. Ely (June 18, 1906), supra note
319, at 137.
340 WHITE, supra note 13, at 448 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Rosika
Schwimmer (Jan. 30, 1930)) (explaining that he typically viewed cases as problem-solving
exercises).
341 See A Dissenting Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1929, at 28.
342 Id.
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time would get her into jail,” the Times writer observed.343 And in that respect, the
Schwimmer case brings to mind
[t]he whole question of American intolerance . . . . Here is a brave
thinker who follows his thought and would allow the largest liberty
of opinion. There have been few judges as learned. His learning is
the least of his gifts. His generous spirit strives always for free-
dom in all directions. . . . [He] may be said to be the defender[]
of minorities, of not only theoretic but applied freedom.344
In portraying the old Thayerian judge as at once brilliant, brave, and eminently
concerned with individual liberty, the Times writer was well within the mainstream
of public opinion of the time.345 Towards the end of his career, G. Edward White ob-
served in 1971, “Holmes stood on the threshold of deification. He stepped from . . .
[the] shadow” of his father346—the well-known author of The Autocrat of the Breakfast
Table347—“by transcending his privileged background through tolerance and sympathy
for thoughts and life styles foreign to his own.”348
In a pair of early 1930s American Mercury articles,349 however, Mencken hit
back at the widespread image of Holmes as a “liberal and lovable philosopher.”350
In the earlier article, entitled Mr. Justice Holmes351—a review of a compilation of
Holmes’s dissents352—Mencken pointed out that Holmes always remained, first and
foremost, a thoroughgoing majoritarian.353 Despite having received “so much
attention . . . from hopeful Liberals,”354 Mencken informed his readers, it was hard
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 See generally I. Scott Messinger, Legitimating Liberalism: The New Deal Image-
makers and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 20 J.SUP.CT.HIST. 57 (1995) (providing an account
of how liberal intellectuals championed Holmes); Brad Snyder, The House that Built Holmes,
30 L. & HIST. REV. 661 (2012) (discussing the role that liberal intellectuals played in
canonizing Holmes).
346 G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 61 (1971).
347 Holmes’s father—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.—of course, wrote a well-known series
of essays for The Atlantic Monthly called The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table. See generally
WILLIAM C. DOWLING, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES IN PARIS: MEDICINE, THEOLOGY, AND THE
AUTOCRAT OF THE BREAKFAST TABLE (2006) (discussing the life and work of Holmes, Sr.).
348 White, supra note 346, at 61.
349 See Mencken, supra note 166, at 122–24; H.L. Mencken, The Great Holmes Mystery,
AM. MERCURY, May 1932, at 123–26.
350 Holmes, 90, Quits the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1932, at 1.
351 See generally Mencken, supra note 166, at 122–23.
352 In Mr. Justice Holmes, Mencken reviewed a compilation of Holmes’s dissents entitled
The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes. See id. at 122.
353 See id. at 122–24.
354 Id. at 122.
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to see how the great majority of his opinions could have possibly advanced the cause
of individual liberty.355 “[I]f I do not misread his plain words,” Mencken continued,
Holmes was decidedly not
a sworn advocate of the rights of man. . . . [H]e was actually no
more than an advocate of the rights of law-makers. There, in-
deed, is the clue to his whole jurisprudence. He believes that the
law-making bodies should be free to experiment almost ad
libitum, [and] that the courts should not call a halt upon them
until they clearly pass the uttermost bounds of reason . . . .
. . . Bear this doctrine in mind, and you will have an ade-
quate explanation, on the one hand, of those forward-looking
opinions which console the Liberals—for example, . . . the child
labor case[], . . .—and on the other hand, of the reactionary
opinions which they so politely overlook—for example, . . . the
Debs case . . . .356
Even so, in the later article—a review of two books about Holmes entitled The
Great Holmes Mystery357—Mencken noticed that something was amiss with Holmes’s
Abrams opinion and few others like it. Although Mencken guessed that Holmes was,
by default, contemptuous of ordinary people, as well as “precise, pedantic, unimagi-
native, even harsh,” he theorized that every once in a while, on an occasional off-day,
“a strange amiability overcame him.”358 As best as Mencken could tell, that impulse
simply overwhelmed him, without much in the way of explanation, as if it had
momentarily seized him from the outside.359 Yet it was precisely that impulse that
allowed him to set aside his usual defense of the rights of legislatures, and to instead
set forth “the case for the widest freedom . . . of the individual citizen . . . with a
magnificent clarity.”360
Although Mencken could not have possibly known it, Holmes would have easily
recognized the amiable impulse he described in The Great Holmes Mystery. That
impulse was none other than the democratic feeling Holmes mentioned in his The
355 See id. at 122–24.
356 Id. at 122–23.
357 Mencken, supra note 349, at 123–25. The books Mencken reviewed in The Great
Holmes Mystery were a Holmes biography by journalist Silas Bent entitled Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes; and a 1931 compilation of essays about Holmes entitled Mr. Justice
Holmes. See id. at 123.
358 Mencken, supra note 349, at 124.
359 Id. at 123–24 (“[Holmes was] beset by occasional doubts, hesitations, flashes of humor,
bursts of affability, moments of sneaking pity.”).
360 Id. at 124.
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Use of Law Schools speech,361 and that he described over the years in letters to friends.
Holmes, in fact, had by then already incorporated the democratic feeling into his
political thought on at least two occasions.
Holmes first did so in The Puritan, an 1886 speech he delivered at the First
Church in Cambridge in Harvard Square.362 In his address, Holmes hailed the
democratic feeling as both the flower of New England’s Puritan culture and its most
powerful legacy. “Two hundred and fifty years ago a few devout men founded . . .
[this] congregational church, from which grew a democratic state,” he explained to
his audience.363 “Whether they knew it or not,” he continued,
[t]hese men and their fellows . . . planted something mightier
even than institutions. . . . [T]hey planted the democratic spirit
in the heart of man. It is to them we owe . . . that instinct, that
spark that makes the American unable to meet his fellow man
otherwise than simply as a man, eye to eye, hand to hand, and
foot to foot, wrestling naked on the sand.364
Despite speaking favorably of the spread of the idea of “democratic freedom,”
however, Holmes believed “the somewhat isolated thread of our intellectual and
spiritual life is rejoining the main stream.”365 The future, he maintained, did not
belong to the Puritans or even to 17th century free speech advocate John Milton.366
Rather, it belonged to the likes of Thomas Hobbes,367 the hard-nosed political theorist
who taught, centuries earlier, that “the law-making power” was necessarily superior
to the law.368
361 See THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note
303, at 36–37.
362 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Puritan, in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 303, at 24.
363 Id. at 25.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 26.
366 See id. According to law professor Ronald K.L. Collins, Holmes’s marketplace
metaphor in Abrams actually “trace[s] back” to the defense of free speech Milton put forward
in his well-known Areopagitica. See Collins, supra note 56, at 282. See generally JOHN
MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 35 (Cambridge at University Press 1918) (1644) (“Let [Truth] and
Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?”).
Milton, of course, also wrote the famous epic poem Paradise Lost, among other works. See
generally ANNA BEER, MILTON: POET, PAMPHLETEER, PATRIOT (2008) (discussing the life
and work of Milton).
367 HOLMES, supra note 362, at 26.
368 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Richard T. Ely (Nov. 24, 1912), in Rader
& Rader, supra note 308, at 145. See generally JOHANN SOMMERVILLE, THOMAS HOBBES:
POLITICAL IDEAS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT (1992) (examining Hobbes’s political writings).
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Nearly 20 years later—in a 1904 eulogy in memory of Boston-area artist and
women’s education advocate Sarah W. Whitman369—Holmes again incorporated the
democratic feeling into his political thought. The highest goal that any reformer can
aspire to, Holmes mentioned midway through his address, is to help “keep society
together and alive.”370 And assuming that premise, Holmes continued, Whitman’s
activism was wholly invaluable.371 “It seems to me . . . that those who let their
democratic feeling grow cold . . . do more than any others to shake the present order
of things,” Holmes shared.372 “If I am right, a woman who meets her kind with Mrs.
Whitman’s sympathy, with Mrs. Whitman’s democracy of soul, is, on the other
hand, a pillar and a bond to uphold and to unite the Commonwealth.”373 “I called her
friend and neighbour,” Holmes recalled at last, with a fond sadness, “I think . . .
[others] have noticed the same thing[.] . . . [S]he was our neighbour as the Samaritan
was [a] neighbour in the parable.”374
In 1908, however, after being presented with the case of Harriman v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, Holmes began to get the sense that the democratic feeling
was on the retreat.375 The Harriman case began when the Interstate Commerce
Commission (“ICC”) decided to investigate certain railroads in part to simply be
“fully informed” about them.376 In the course of the inquiry, however, railroad
executive E. H. Harriman and financier Otto Kahn declined to answer certain of the
ICC’s questions,377 and the ICC responded by asking the courts to compel their
testimony.378 In making its case, the ICC asserted that it had the power, under the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, to “make any investigation that it deem[ed]
proper” and that it could require testimony pursuant to those investigations.379 But
Holmes, writing for the Court,380 flatly rejected the ICC’s argument. As a matter of
statutory interpretation, he reasoned, the ICC could only require testimony that
pertained to “a specific breach of law.”381 “We could not believe[,] on the strength
369 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Address of Mr. Justice Holmes, in SARAH WHITMAN 25,
25 (1904).
370 Id. at 27.
371 Id.
372 Id. at 26–27.
373 Id. at 27.
374 Id. at 26; see Luke 10:30–37 (recounting the parable of the good Samaritan).
375 See 211 U.S. 407 (1908).
376 Id. at 414. The ICC also investigated the railroads in order to determine whether they
had violated the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), or defeated
its purposes. See id.
377 Id. at 414–17.
378 See id. at 416.
379 Id. at 417.
380 Justice William Day dissented, and Justices John Marshall Harlan and Joseph McKenna
concurred in his dissent. See id. at 423–29 (Day, J., dissenting). Justice William Henry Moody
did not take part in the decision. Id. at 422.
381 Id. at 419–20 (majority opinion).
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of other than explicit and unmistakable words,” he added, that Congress intended
to give the ICC the “autocratic power” it asserted.382
The lesson Holmes took from Harriman was that the country had fallen into a
“soft period of culture”383 in which the overriding tendency was to forget that
“personal liberty [is] worth fighting for.”384 The Harriman case “made my blood . . .
boil,” he admitted to Laski in 1916, and “it made my heart sick to think that [it]
excited no general revolt.”385 “I have noticed the composure with which we listen
to claims of right to examine anybody on anything . . . , e.g.[,] Harriman,” Holmes
told sociologist Edward Ross a few years earlier, “[and] I do sometimes wonder
whether by long taking freedom for granted we have not forgotten that its price was
eternal vigilance.”386
In May 1919, after reading Espionagent, Holmes similarly got the sense that the
democratic feeling was on the retreat.387 “[T]he general aspects of the article . . .
stirred my sympathies,” Holmes shared with Laski soon after reading it.388 “As long
ago as . . . Harriman,” he continued, “it seemed to me that we so long had enjoyed
the advantages protected by bills of rights that we had forgotten . . . that they . . .
could not be kept unless we were willing to fight for them.”389 Holmes’s comparison
of Espionagent to Harriman, it turns out, was perfect; the very notion of censorship
outraged him as much as the ICC’s behavior had. As then–law professor Felix
Frankfurter390 would recall in 1932, Holmes “flared up . . . with heat” when the issue
of censorship came up.391 “I never could understand by what right that’s done,” he
382 Id. at 421. In dicta, Holmes also suggested he thought the ICC’s assertion of power was
unconstitutional: “If we felt more hesitation than we do” about our interpretation of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Holmes added, “we still should feel bound to construe [it]
not merely so as to sustain its constitutionality[,] but so as to avoid a succession of
constitutional doubts.” Id. at 422.
383 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), supra note 45,
at 19.
384 ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 63
(2001) (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Alice S. Green (Dec. 18, 1914)).
385 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), supra note 45,
at 19.
386 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Edward Ross (May 20, 1914), supra note 115
(emphasis added).
387 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919), supra note 182,
at 202–03.
388 Id. at 203–04.
389 Id. at 203.
390 Frankfurter also served as a Supreme Court justice, among other roles. See, e.g.,
Jerome A. Cohen, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 591, 591–97 (1962) (discussing
Frankfurter’s career).
391 Felix Frankfurter, Unpublished Anecdotes (Aug. 10, 1932) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/43123800/14
[https://perma.cc/8APE-9DAS].
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remembered Holmes saying.392 “I should think constitutional rights are here clearly
involved and to be protected.”393
The problem that Espionagent and Harriman presented to Holmes, then, was the
onset of the dark future he predicted decades earlier in The Puritan, and that he did
not realize was at his doorstep years earlier when he eulogized Whitman. Liberty,
Holmes had always believed, depended to a great extent on the tolerance the stronger
groups in a society were willing to extend to the weaker ones,394 and he was now
seeing the glow of that tolerance fade away. But rather than paving the way for the
country to slide further into the Hobbesian night, on the occasion of Abrams, he
fought back with everything he had.395
Holmes plainly acknowledged in his dissent that liberty of speech was ulti-
mately in the hands of the strong.396 “To allow opposition by speech,” he wrote,
“seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, . . . or that you do not care
whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your pre-
mises.”397 But he also recognized that dominant factions did not always remember
their deepest convictions, even if they reliably returned to them over the long haul.
The Sedition Act of 1798398—enacted during the “crisis atmosphere” of the Quasi-
War with France399—had taught him that his countrymen were not invulnerable to
the hydraulic pressure of fear. “I had conceived that the United States[,] through many
years[,] had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines
that it imposed.”400 In the context of his opinion, it was equally an indictment of the




394 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 31, 1917), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, supra note 45, at 74, 74 (“It is a question of policy and power how far the
strongest will stand the others.”); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock
(Oct. 26, 1919), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, supra note 68, at 27, 28 (“[T]he territorial
club (i.e., the nation), while it lasts, must have the army. While it has the army the extent to
which it will allow other clubs depends upon its will . . . .”).
395 See HEALY, supra note 63, at 203 (noting that Holmes described writing his Abrams
dissent “as if possessed”).
396 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
397 Id.
398 Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 596.
399 WENDELL BIRD, PRESS AND SPEECH UNDER ASSAULT: THE EARLY SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES, THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798, AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSENT 253 (2016);
see Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939, 941 (2009)
(“Against the drumbeat of imminent war with [France], the Federalists enacted the Sedition
Act of 1798.”).
400 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
401 See also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Feb. 10, 1918), supra
note 142, at 161 (“I don’t worry much about possible coordinated public changes, and I
hardly think [the] chaos [of the Russian Revolution] is to be apprehended here.”); Letter from
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Armed with the conviction that legislative majorities sometimes lose sight of who
they are, Holmes repudiated, at long last, the political ideas he set out in The Puritan.402
No longer did he think of the United States as a provincial outflowing of the demo-
cratic feeling that was destined to rejoin “the great [Hobbesian] currents of the world’s
life.”403 Instead, the country became a “city . . . on a hill”404—shining for the world to
see, proudly brimming with an empathetic spirit—come what may. The Constitution,
he wrote in Abrams, “is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year[,] if not
every day[,] we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge.”405 The founding charter, he decided in the end, did far more than set a gov-
ernment into motion. It embodied, in an eminently public and consequential way, “the
deepest cause we have to love our country”406—that is, the democratic feeling which
has burned in the Republic’s heart since before the framing generation gave it life.407
In the judgment of history, Holmes’s extraordinary bet on the fundamental
openness and kindness of the American people has paid off handsomely. Although
Holmes’s influence on the sprawling field of free speech law has been far from even or
universal, it has nevertheless proven to be wide-ranging, enduring, and even paradigm-
forming.408 After all, as Healy observed in 2013, “the First Amendment . . . was still
largely an unfulfilled promise” at the time of Abrams.409
Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Oct. 26, 1919), supra note 394, at 28–29
(“Some of our subordinate Judges seem to me to have been hysterical during the war.”);
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 17, 1920), supra note 141, at 222
(“I cannot believe . . . this country will repeat [the Russian Revolution].”).
402 See also RABBAN, supra note 72, at 1310 (noting that Holmes’s Abrams dissent
“reflected a . . . readjustment in his personal ideology”).
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407 In 1962, Rogat discussed how Holmes’s view of sovereignty affected his treatment of
aliens. See Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN L. REV. 3,
13–44 (1962). Aside from a section that examined three opinions which Holmes joined but
did not write, see id. at 37–39, and which “turned on statutory construction” rather than on
any theory of sovereignty, id. at 37, Rogat’s discussion considered cases that predated
Abrams. See id. at 10–44.
G. Edward White later relied on Rogat’s discussion when he argued that Holmes’s
“language [in Schwimmer] suggests [his] abandonment, in free speech cases, of a positivist
view of sovereignty.” WHITE, supra note 13, at 448. White, however, did not see the
connection between Holmes’s understanding of sovereignty and his Abrams dissent. Rather
than representing “a considered reexamination of his general views on the proper stance of
the judiciary in constitutional cases,” White argued, Holmes’s Abrams opinion and those that
followed it instead represented “something of a rhetorical spree.” Id. at 413.
408 See generally Collins, supra note 56, at 349–78 (discussing Holmes’s influence on free
speech law); RABBAN, supra note 57, at 371–76 (examining Holmes’s impact on the law of
free speech).
409 HEALY, supra note 63, at 3.
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The Supreme Court itself had never ruled in favor of a free
speech claim, and lower courts had approved all manner of [free]
speech restrictions, including the censorship of books and films,
the prohibition of street corner speeches, and assorted bans on
labor protests, profanity, and commercial advertising. Even
criticism of government officials could be punished . . . if it
threatened public order and morality.410
Yet, “[i]n his Abrams opinion and the opinions following it,” free speech scholar
Ronald K. L. Collins observed a few years earlier, “[Holmes] ushered in an entire new
way of thinking about free speech.”411 Due in large part to his vision, Collins wrote,
the First Amendment came, in time, to enjoy a centrality that it
had not previously experienced. In the process, probability
became more doubtful; harm became more tolerable; experimen-
tation became more desirable; truth became less categorical; and
free speech freedom became more durable. . . . It is undeniable:
free speech in America was never the same after [Abrams].412
In his Abrams dissent, then, far from merely offering technical insights into what
the First Amendment means, Holmes provided the lens through which the genera-
tions that followed him interpreted the founding charter itself. And in that respect,
Holmes rose well above the rank of an able judge; remarkably, he took a seat along-
side our Constitution-makers.413 In Abrams and in the related opinions that followed
it, Holmes reminded the nation, in the most dramatic of ways, what it always had
been, and what it was destined to become once again. What Holmes had always
known—and what the country seems to have always known as well—is that there
is nothing more American than bowing one’s head in reverent silence at the brave
and awe-inspiring lesson of the beautiful Nazarene, who taught the world nearly two
millennia ago, “Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. [And again,
b]lessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.”414
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411 Collins, supra note 56, at 376–77.
412 Id. at 377.
413 See generally Richard A. Posner, Introduction, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note
4 (discussing Holmes’s legacy).
414 Matthew 5:7–8 (King James).
